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I. INTRODUCTION
HE proliferation of digital evidence and discovery has raised seri-
ous questions about litigation fraud in recent years. Legal tabloids
are often headlined with the latest example of discovery abuse that
resulted in multi-million dollar sanctions. But what about the cases of
serious discovery abuse or perjury that neither the opposing party nor the
court catch during the litigation? These abuses may very well lead to
judgments that do not reflect a result based on the true merits of the case.
If a party seeks relief based on fraud within one year from the entry of
judgment, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) gives the trial court ple-
nary power to vacate the judgment.1 For fraud discovered outside of one
year, however, the district court's powers are more limited, and relief is
often contingent upon whether the fraud is deemed intrinsic or extrinsic. 2
Indeed, a majority of the circuits hold that after one year, a party cannot
obtain post-judgment relief based on perjury or discovery abuse because
these frauds are intrinsic.3 This Article contends that the distinction be-
tween intrinsic and extrinsic fraud should be abolished because Twombly
and Iqbal have created an effective pleading-stage screening mechanism
to prevent the meritless relitigation of cases.
This Article proceeds in five parts. Part II examines the origins and
history of modern post-judgment relief before and after the adoption of
Rule 60. Next, Part III explores the distinction between intrinsic and ex-
trinsic fraud in the context of independent actions. Part IV of this Article
addresses the rise of plausibility pleading in Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
1. See FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b).
2. Compare FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b), with FED. R. Civ. P. 60(d).
3. See, e.g., Fierro v. Johnson, 197 F.3d 147, 155 (5th Cir. 1999); Lindo v. City & Cnty.
of S.F., Dep't of Soc. Servs., No. 94-15335, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 30620, at *3-4 (9th Cir.
Oct. 31, 1994); Great Coastal Express, Inc. v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 675 F.2d 1349,
1355-57 (4th Cir. 1982); Wood v. McEwen, 644 F.2d 797, 801 (9th Cir. 1981); Hanna v.
Brictson Mfg. Co., 62 F.2d 139, 148 (8th Cir. 1932).
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Twombly and Ashcroft v. Iqbal.4 In these cases, the Supreme Court over-
ruled Conley v. Gibson, announcing a new pleading paradigm that applies
to all civil actions filed in federal court, including judgment-relief ac-
tions.5 In a move away from notice pleading, the Court held that a civil
complaint must plausibly allege a cause of action.6 Finally, Part V of this
Article contends that this increased pleading scrutiny serves as a better
screening mechanism for post-judgment fraud claims than the distinction
between intrinsic and extrinsic fraud. By screening fraud claims individu-
ally, a court can better assess whether the claim could have been raised in
the original litigation. Screening cases for this trait results in a better
balance between the often competing values of judgments that reflect
truth and judgments that are final.
II. THE HISTORY OF RELIEF FROM JUDGMENTS
PROCURED BY FRAUD
Throughout legal history, losing parties have sought procedural vehi-
cles through which to bring complaints about the accuracy of judgments
or the adequacy of the proceedings that led to those judgments. At com-
mon law, courts developed an elaborate writ system to provide this type
of relief.7 The independent action at equity was also contemplated in
these early procedures and provided relief from judgments procured by
fraud, among other reasons. 8 Later, post-judgment relief mechanisms
were consolidated under Original Rule 60 in an attempt to modernize
and simplify post-judgment relief practice. 9 After recognizing that Origi-
nal Rule 60 allowed many ancient, complex procedures to persist, the
Rule was amended to further streamline and modernize post-judgment
relief practices.' 0 The distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic fraud,
however, has stubbornly thwarted this trend toward liberalization and
simplicity and remains a part of some jurisdictions' post-judgment relief
practices more than a century after its unfortunate inception.
4. See generally Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949-54 (2009); Bell At. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556-57 (2007).
5. See lqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949-54; Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556-57. This Article does
not address the direct attacks on criminal judgments contemplated by the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure. In the habeas corpus setting, however, Rule 60 does provide a frame-
work for civil relief from criminal judgments in some situations. See Johnson v. Bell, 605
F.3d 333, 339 (6th Cir. 2010). Indeed, the law surrounding Rule 60 can undoubtedly have
life and death significance in habeas cases. See id. (affirming the denial of Rule 60 relief in
a capital case).
6. See Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949-50; Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556.
7. See 12 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE, § 60 App. 100






A. RELIEF FROM FINAL JUDGMENTS BEFORE THE
ADOPTION OF RULE 60
Before Rule 60(b) was adopted, a court could not, in ordinary circum-
stances, modify or vacate its own judgments after the term in which the
court rendered the judgment at issue. 1 This limitation extended to both
courts of law and equity.12 As a result of this limitation, courts developed
various procedural mechanisms to revisit their judgments. 13 These proce-
dures included ancient writs and bills whose names, by modern standards,
sound like they were stripped from the pages of an ancient spell book.
Among the possible avenues to seek post-term relief from a court was the
writ of coram nobis (or coram vobis) (for challenges based on errors of
fact that preceded the rendition of judgment), the writ of audita querela
(for challenges based on errors of fact that preceded the judgment and
matters subsequent to judgment, such as discharge), the bill of review, the
bill in the nature of a bill of review (both used to challenge decrees in
equity based on various grounds, including fraud and newly discovered
evidence), and the independent action in equity.14 Using these ancient
remedies, legal sorcerers of the era sought relief from judgments and de-
crees in the same court that rendered them after that court had lost ple-
nary power to modify or vacate the particular judgment because of the
term rule.' 5 Ultimately, however, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
supplanted the ancient remedies.' 6 In particular, Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 60 was adopted in an attempt to unify post-judgment relief
practice in the federal courts.17 Even after the adoption of modern Rule
60(b), however, the independent action at equity continues to provide an
avenue for relief from judgments obtained by fraud. 18
1. Vacating Judgments Obtained by Interparty Fraud Through the
Independent Action
Relief from a judgment through the independent action was available
when one party committed fraud against another party (interparty fraud)
11. In one example of the limited exceptions to the term rule, a court could modify a
judgment from a previous term where a party began the appropriate proceedings during
the term in which the court rendered the judgment. See United States v. Mayer, 235 U.S.
55, 67 (1914); see also Del., Lackawanna & W. R.R. v. Rellstab, 276 U.S. 1, 5 (1928); In re
Metro. Trust Co. of N.Y., 218 U.S. 312, 320 (1910).
12. See Mayer, 235 U.S. at 67; see also MOORE'S, supra note 7, at § 60 App. 101, et seq.
(discussing thoroughly the history of Rule 60(b) and other post-judgment relief methods).
13. See MOORE'S, supra note 7, at § 60 App. 100; see also Rellstab, 276 U.S. at 5; In re
Metro. Trust, 218 U.S. at 320-21.
14. See, e.g., Lovejoy v. Murray, 70 U.S. 1, 12 (1866) (writ of audita querela); Whiting
v. Bank of U.S., 38 U.S. 6, 13 (1839) (bill of review and bill in the nature of a bill of
review); Pickett's Heirs v. Legerwood, 32 U.S. 144, 147 (1833) (writ of coram nobis);
MOORE'S, supra note 7, at § 60 App. 104 (independent action in equity).
15. See Mayer, 235 U.S. at 67-68.
16. See Hollee S. Temple, Raining on the Litigation Parade: Is it Time to Stop Litigant





to obtain a judgment against that party. The independent action was a
remedy through which various complaints about a judgment, including
fraud, could be brought.19 This procedural device was available in either
the court that rendered the prior judgment or another court having com-
petent jurisdiction.20 Generally, parties used the independent action to
seek relief when they did not have an opportunity to fully present their
claims in the previous litigation because of fraud, mistake, or newly dis-
covered evidence, 21 among other reasons. 22 In particular, an indepen-
dent action, as opposed to an action predicated solely on the court's
inherent power to vacate judgments based on fraud by a judicial officer,
could be based on interparty fraud.23 But the independent action, as op-
posed to a request for the court to use its inherent power to vacate a
judgment, was subject to equitable limitations. 24 These limitations in-
cluded the requirement that a party act diligently in seeking relief
through the action, file the action before laches precluded relief, and
come to the court with clean hands.25 Importantly, the independent ac-
tion was available only for interparty extrinsic fraud, not intrinsic fraud.26
The distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic fraud is rooted in the
United States Supreme Court decision United States v. Throckmorton.27
In Throckmorton, the United States filed a bill in chancery (known in
modern terms, and hereinafter referred to, as the independent action in
equity) to set aside a twenty-year-old decree made in 1856 by the United
States District Court for California.28 The decree confirmed a land grant
in California made by the government of Mexico 29 to W.A. Richardson. 30
19. See Pickford v. Talbott, 225 U.S. 651, 657 (1912); see also MOORE'S, supra note 7,
at § 60 App. 100.
20. See Pickford, 225 U.S. at 658.
21. A few courts have held that relief for newly discovered evidence may be available
by independent action. See Johnson Waste Materials v. Marshall, 611 F.2d 593, 597 (5th
Cir. 1980). Courts and commentators agree, however, that something beyond the plain
Rule 60(b)(2) showing of newly discovered evidence is required to obtain relief. See id.;
see also MOORE'S, supra note 7, at § 60.81[4].
22. See Pickford, 225 U.S. at 658; see also Thomas D. Clark, Comment, Rule 60(b):
Survey and Proposal for General Reform, 60 CAL. L. REV. 531, 535 (1972).
23. See Marshall v. Holmes, 141 U.S. 589, 601 (1891) (court will enjoin a judgment
procured by the fraud of one party against the other). But see United States v.
Throckmorton, 98 U.S. 61, 68 (1878) (independent action in equity will not lie for in-
terparty fraud where the fraud is intrinsic to the proceedings that led to the original judg-
ment). The distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic fraud and the distinction's impact on
the availability of relief in an independent action are discussed in depth, infra.
24. See Pickford, 225 U.S. at 657; 11 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER &
MARY KAY KANE, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2868 (2d ed. 1995) [hereinafter
WRIGHT, MILLER & KANE] (noting that the requirements of the independent action were
laid out "long before the adoption of the [c]ivil [r]ules").
25. See, e.g., Bankers Mortg. Co. v. United States, 423 F.2d 73, 79 (5th Cir. 1970) (stat-
ing the equitable requirements); see also In re Casco Chem. Co., 335 F.2d 645, 651 (5th Cir.
1964) (laches applies).
26. See Throckmorton, 98 U.S. at 68.
27. See id. (discussing the distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic fraud).
28. Id. at 62.
29. Id. At the time of the alleged grant, Mexico had sovereign control over what be-




The independent action sought to overturn the decree in favor of Rich-
ardson because he submitted fraudulent, falsified documents in support
of his case.31
In 1852, Mr. Richardson applied for a confirmation of the land grant to
the board of commissioners of private land claims in California. 32 Some-
time after filing his petition, he became aware that the evidence of his
claim was insufficient. 33 So he traveled to Mexico in search of
Micheltorena, the former political chief of California when the state was
under Mexican control.34 Richardson found Micheltorena and had him
sign and falsely backdate a land grant in support of Richardson's land
claim.35 Upon his return to the United States, Richardson submitted the
falsified land grant, along with the depositions of perjured witnesses in
support of the document, to the board of commissioners. 36 The board
confirmed the grant to Richardson in 1853, and the district court issued a
decree again confirming the grant in 1856.37
The Supreme Court declined to overturn the district court's decree,
holding that the Court would disturb a decree or judgment procured by
fraud only where the fraud is "extrinsic or collateral[] to the matter tried
by the first court, and not to a fraud in the matter on which the decree
was rendered. '' 38 Indeed, the Court noted that the falsified land grant
from Micheltorena was the central document in the underlying litigation
and that the entire, original matter turned on its authenticity and valid-
ity.39 Expounding on examples of fraud that could potentially provide a
basis for relief, Justice Miller, writing for the Court, observed that fraud
could undermine a judgment:
where, by reason of something done by the successful party to a suit,
there was in fact no adversary trial or decision of the issue in the case
.... by keeping him away from court, a false promise of a compro-
mise; or where the defendant never had knowledge of the suit, being
kept in ignorance by the acts of the plaintiff; or where an attorney
fraudulently or without authority assumes to represent a party and
connives at his defeat; or where the attorney regularly employed cor-
ruptly sells out his client's interest to the other side.40
Thus, where "there has never been a real contest in the trial or hearing
of the case" 41 because of fraud, the fraud is extrinsic and relief will lie.42








38. Id. at 68.
39. See id.
40. Id. at 65-66.




ment or perjured testimony, the fraud is intrinsic to the matters tried, and
relief is not available from the judgment by independent action. 43 Not
surprisingly, the distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic fraud in
Throckmorton proved to be blurry and difficult to apply in practice.
These difficulties became strikingly evident thirteen years after
Throckmorton in Marshall v. Holmes.44
In Marshall, Sarah Marshall, a plaintiff in an independent action sought
to enjoin the enforcement of multiple state court judgments taken against
her.45 The judgments, according to Marshall, were the product of fraud.46
In particular, Marshall alleged that the plaintiff in the underlying lawsuit
against her used evidence of a forged letter to obtain the judgments.47
Sometime after the suit was filed in Louisiana state court, Marshall
sought to remove the case to federal court on diversity grounds. 48 The
state court refused the application for removal, and Marshall lost on the
merits of her suit.49
The Supreme Court, in an opinion written by Justice Harlan, reversed
the decision of the lower court, on the ground that removal was proper,
and vacated all of the orders of the state court after Marshall filed the
failed petition for removal. 50 The Court's opinion also included, how-
ever, significant dicta related to the merits of the fraud claim.51 The
Court observed the "settled doctrine" that a party may obtain relief from
a judgment where fraud prevents a fact from being a part of the original
litigation when the fact "clearly proves it to be against conscience to exe-
cute a judgment. ' 52 Interestingly, the Court cited Throckmorton in sup-
port of this seemingly broad judgment relief language. 53 Relying on the
Marshall dicta together with the case's facts-evidence of a forged let-
ter-some courts held that the distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic
fraud was eliminated. 54 While this reading of Marshall ignores the actual
43. Id.
44. See Marshall v. Holmes, 141 U.S. 589, 596-97 (1891).
45. Id. at 589.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 590.
49. Id.
50. See id. at 601.
51. See id. at 596.
52. Id.
53. See id.
54. The Supreme Court had the opportunity to address the distinction between intrin-
sic and extrinsic fraud several times after it decided Throckmorton. See, e.g., Toledo Scale
Co. v. Computing Scale Co., 261 U.S. 399, 421 (1923). But the Court has consistently
punted the issue. For instance, in Toledo Scale Co., a party sought an injunction against
the enforcement of a patent judgment on the basis that the other party fraudulently con-
cealed evidence during the original proceeding. Id. at 423-24. Justice Taft, writing for the
Court, avoided deciding whether the distinction was viable, writing "[w]e do not find our-
selves obliged to enter upon a consideration of the sometimes nice distinctions made be-
tween intrinsic and extrinsic frauds in the application of the rule." Id. at 421. Taft was able
to avoid making a decision on the issue by resolving the case on other equitable considera-
tions, holding that "to justify setting aside a decree for fraud whether extrinsic or intrinsic,
it must appear that the fraud charged really prevented the party complaining from making
20111
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holding of the case (limited to the jurisdictional question) and the nuance
of the opinion's remaining language, the reading is likely motivated by
the problems inherent in the intrinsic/extrinsic fraud distinction. Why, for
instance, should conclusive evidence of perjury not override judgment fi-
nality? 55 Are we comfortable as a society that some of the decrees of our
final arbiters are, at their essence, untrue? As a result of the confusion
stemming from the Throckmorton and Marshall opinions, courts across
the country continue to grapple with these questions. And while the Su-
preme Court had the opportunity to eliminate the problematic distinction
when it promulgated the Rules of Civil Procedure, it chose to allow it to
persist.56
2. The Inherent Power to Vacate Judgments for Fraud on the Court
Another avenue that litigants would often traverse to seek post-term
relief was the court's inherent power to modify or vacate its own judg-
ments after the term expired. 57 Courts created this power as a relief
valve to provide justice and truth in judgments where the court-created
term rule would have ordinarily restricted their ability to do so. 58 While
courts recognized the need to invoke their post-term authority over oth-
erwise final judgments in certain circumstances, the power was, as a prac-
tical matter, narrowly focused and did not provide relief in many cases. 59
But a trial court's inherent power over its own judgments did allow it to
modify or vacate decrees that provided prospective, continuing injunctive
relief,60 to set aside void judgments, 61 or to vacate judgments procured by
a fraud upon the court.62
The United States Supreme Court recognized a court's post-term
power to vacate judgments procured by a fraud upon the court in Hazel-
a full and fair defense." Id. In Toledo Scale Co., according to the Court, the aggrieved
party did not prove that the concealed evidence prevented it from making a full and fair
defense. See id. at 424.
55. As discussed in Part V, infra, proponents of the distinction have long argued that
there is a risk that too many losing litigants will attempt to prove that they are the victims
of perjury (or even claim that they can conclusively establish perjury) in order to perpetu-
ate litigation even when their claims are not meritorious. While this argument might have
carried more weight in the notice pleading era, new heightened pleading standards in the
federal courts minimize the chance that an unsupportable allegation of perjury, even an
allegation that a party can conclusively establish perjury, will survive a motion to dismiss.
See FED. R. Civ. P. 9(b). And even if some unsupportable perjury allegations gain a party
access to discovery, the court has other methods to ferret out the unfounded claim and
punish the party needlessly perpetuating the dispute. See FED. R. Civ. P. 11(c).
56. See infra, Part II.B.
57. See Bucy v. Nev. Constr. Co., 125 F.2d 213, 216-17 (9th Cir. 1942); see also James
Wm. Moore & Elizabeth B. A. Rogers, Federal Relief from Civil Judgments, 55 YALE L.J.
623, 627 (1946).
58. See Moore & Rogers, supra note 57, at 629.
59. See id. at 627 (noting the "occasional" use of the courts' inherent powers and the
inflexibility of the term rule in allowing courts to provide relief).
60. See United States v. Swift & Co., 286 U.S. 106, 114 (1932).
61. See United States v. Sotis, 131 F.2d 783, 787 (7th Cir. 1942).
62. Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. Hartford-Empire Co., 322 U.S. 238, 245 (1944), overruled
on other grounds by Standard Oil of Cal. v. United States, 429 U.S. 17 (1976).
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Atlas Glass Co. v. Hartford-Empire Co. 63 In Hazel-Atlas, the Court was
confronted with egregious litigation fraud but found itself handcuffed by
the intrinsic fraud bar.64 Stuck between the intrinsic fraud bar and unsa-
vory facts that called out for relief, the Court turned to the fraud on the
court doctrine.65 Historically, the fraud on the court doctrine was used to
relieve a party from a judgment procured through fraud by a judicial of-
ficer, like a judge, but the pressure the Court found itself under in Hazel-
Atlas led to a holding that expanded the concept to fraud by attorneys, as
officers of the court. 66 In the underlying litigation, Hartford-Empire Co.
(Hartford) sought a patent from the United States Patent Office (Patent
Office) for a machine that helped make glass bottles.67 The Patent Office
was largely hostile to Hartford's patent application, leaving Hartford
looking for a way to convince the Patent Office to grant the patent.68
Hartford ultimately concocted a scheme to gain credence for its patent
application. 69 As part of this scheme, both Hartford officials and Hart-
ford attorneys drafted a phony article for a glass trade publication. 70 The
article conveniently observed that the machine was "a remarkable ad-
vance in the art of fashioning glass by machine. ' 71 They then convinced a
prominent glass bottling expert to sign the article, creating the impression
that the expert authored it.72 Faced with new evidence that the machine
was indeed "remarkable," putatively authored by a prominent glass bot-
tling expert, the Patent Office granted the application in 1928.73
With its patent still hot off the government's presses, Hartford filed suit
against Hazel-Atlas Glass Company (Hazel) for patent infringement.74
The district court dismissed the action because it found no evidence of
infringement. 75 Hartford appealed the unfavorable decision and prof-
fered the bogus article as a ground for reversal. 76 The circuit court
bought Hartford's argument and reversed the district court's decision,
"[q]uoting copiously from the article" to find that Hazel infringed on
Hartford's patent.77
At the time of the original action, Hazel heard that Hartford's lawyer
was the true author of the article.78 But Hazel decided to rely on other
defenses to the suit in the trial court. 79 After losing in the court of ap-
63. Id.
64. See id. at 244-46.
65. See id. at 248-50.
66. See id. at 250-51.






73. See id. at 240-41.
74. See id. at 241.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 241-42.




peals, Hazel attempted to verify the truth of the allegations about the
article, but Hazel was unable to do so even after hiring an investigator.8 0
As a result, Hazel ultimately resorted to paying Hartford $1,000,000.81
Then, in an unrelated 1941 trial involving Hartford and another party,
expense account documents, accounting records, and other files came to
light that proved Hartford's lawyers and company officials, not the puta-
tive expert author, drafted the phony article.82 Shortly after this discov-
ery, Hazel filed a petition to seek relief from the original 1932 judgment
in the circuit court.83 The circuit court denied relief, and Hazel peti-
tioned the United States Supreme Court.84
Justice Black, writing for the Court, observed the "general rule" that
courts lose the power to vacate their judgments at the expiration of the
term in which the judgment was signed. 85 But "where enforcement of the
judgment is 'manifestly unconscionable,"' a court has the equitable
power to grant relief-even after the term has expired. 86 Although the
judgment from which Hazel sought relief was nine years old (well outside
the term that the court rendered it in), the Court granted Hazel relief.8 7
The judgment, according to Black, was not based on merely the "possi-
bly" perjured testimony of a witness. 88 Instead, the undisputed facts
showed that Hartford was guilty of a deliberate, calculated scheme to
"defraud ... the Circuit Court of Appeals." 89 This scheme was sufficient
to justify relief despite the fact that Hazel may not have been diligent in
pursuing the truth about the bogus article. 90 The Court was willing to
ignore a potential lack of diligence because the fraud did "not concern
only private parties," but rather, was an affront to the administration of
justice and the proper function of the judicial system because the fraud
was perpetrated on the court through the corruption of one of its own
officers, an attorney.9 1 Thus, fraud on the court is properly limited to
situations where a judge or other court officer participates in the fraud. 92
80. Id. at 241-43.
81. See id.
82. Id. at 243.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 244.
85. Id. at 244-45.
86. Id.
87. See id. at 244-51.
88. Id. at 245.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 245-46 (noting that Hazel did all that it should have been expected to do in
any event).
91. Id. at 246. Beyond undermining the judicial system, the Court noted that the fraud
was in a matter that was particularly important to the public-a patent suit. Id. While
patent suits are undoubtedly important to the public, so are many other matters before
district courts across the country. Thus, the strongest rationale for the Court's exercise of
inherent power is likely that the fraud was perpetrated directly on the court by one of its
own officers. See id. at 241-42.
92. Most commentators agree that fraud on the court is a ground for relief where the
claim involves, among other things, the corruption of a judicial officer and injury to more
than a single litigant. Compare MOORE'S, supra note 7, at § 60.81[1][b][v], with WRIGHT,
MILLER & KANE, supra note 24, at § 2870. And an independent action is a remedy through
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Including attorneys in this category is likely a good idea, but it would not
have been necessary if the aggrieved party could have obtained relief
through an independent action because of perjured testimony in the orig-
inal action.
B. THE SUPREME COURT ATrEMPTS TO CONSOLIDATE RELIEF FROM
JUDGMENTS UNDER ORIGINAL RULE 60(b)
In 1937, the Supreme Court substantially revised the procedures for
seeking relief from fraudulent judgments when it promulgated Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 60.93 Subpart (a) of Original Rule 60 allowed
courts to correct clerical errors in their judgments. 94 Subpart (b), on the
other hand, allowed district courts to provide substantive relief from
judgments where granting relief required more than the correction of a
clerical error.95 Original Rule 60(b) read:
(b) Mistake; Inadvertence; Surprise; Excusable Neglect. On mo-
tion the court, upon such terms as are just, may relieve a party or his
legal representative from a judgment, order, or proceeding taken
against him through his mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable
neglect. The motion shall be made within a reasonable time, but in
no case exceeding six months after such judgment, order, or proceed-
ing was taken. A motion under this subdivision does not affect the
finality of a judgment or suspend its operation. This rule does not
limit the power of a court (1) to entertain an action to relieve a party
from a judgment, order, or proceeding, or (2) to set aside within one
year, as provided in Section 57 of the Judicial Code, U.S.C., Title 28,
§ 118, a judgment obtained against a defendant not actually person-
ally notified.96
Original Rule 60(b) provided a simplified motion practice to obtain
relief based on the grounds enumerated in the Rule when compared to
the ancient remedies that preceded the Rule. 97 But disappointingly, the
Rule did not appear to allow a court to grant relief from a judgment pro-
cured by fraud or in light of newly discovered evidence. 98 This problem
which fraud or fraud on the court claims may be brought. See id. Substantial confusion
remains, however, in courts where the independent action is often confused with a fraud on
the court claim and vice-versa. See id.; see also, e.g., M. W. Zack Metal Co. v. Int'l Naviga-
tion Corp. of Monrovia, 675 F.2d 525, 529-30 (2d Cir. 1982).
93. FED. R. Civ. P. 60 (1936) (superseded 1946), reprinted in MOORE'S, supra note 7,
at § 60 App. 10[1]; see also Note, Attacking Fraudulently Obtained Judgments In The Fed-
eral Courts, 48 IOWA L. REV. 398, 399 (1963) ("Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) is a
codification of one practice in respect to the correction of judgments after the time period
for appeal has expired.").
94. See MOORE'S, supra note 7, at § 60 App. 10[1].
95. Id.; see also Moore & Rogers, supra note 57, at 631-32.
96. MOORE'S, supra note 7, at § 60 App. 10[1].
97. Id.; see also Charles William Patrick, Jr., Note, Relief from Unfairly Obtained Ver-
dicts in Federal Court: Determination and Analysis of the Level of Fraud Required for Va-
cation of Judgments Under FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b), 30 S.C. L. REv. 781, 787-88 (1979).
98. See FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b) advisory committee's note (1937), reprinted in MOORE'S,




stemmed, in large part, from the textual ancestor of Original Rule
60(b). 99 The Rules Advisory Committee that drafted Original Rule 60(b)
based the Rule on the conservatively drafted section 473 of the California
Code of Civil Procedure. 100 In particular, the first two sentences of Rule
60(b) were taken, nearly verbatim, from the California Code. °10 The first
sentence, by its express terms, narrowly provided relief for mistake, inad-
vertence, surprise, or excusable neglect. 10 2 But the Rule was silent with
respect to judgments procured by fraud and newly discovered evi-
dence.1 0 3 This narrow drafting did not, however, stop courts from upset-
ting judgments obtained by fraud for exactly these reasons.' 0 4 Courts
found three toeholds to broaden the Rule from its facially narrow text.
First, the narrow drafting of the first sentence (limited to mistake, inad-
vertence, surprise, or excusable neglect) of the Rule gave way to a more
liberal construction that included the ability to grant relief from judg-
ments procured by fraud, based largely on California state decisions liber-
ally interpreting corresponding section 473 of the California Code. 10 5
Thus, despite the absence of a specific reference to "fraud" in Original
Rule 60(b), courts interpreted the provision to allow this specific relief.10 6
Second, Rule 60(b) contained two savings clauses that section 473 did
not.10 7 Most significantly, according to the first savings clause, the terms
of the Rule did "not limit the power of a court ... to entertain an action
99. See id.
100. Basing Rule 60(b) largely on section 473 of the California Code appears to have
come after several drafts of Rule 60(b) were circulated at the suggestion of a member of
the original Rules Advisory Committee from California. See MOORE'S, supra note 7, at
§ 60 App. 102[4]. This is particularly unfortunate because previous drafts of the rule did
not slavishly track the California Code and allowed, by their terms, more comprehensive
relief. See April 1937 Draft of Rule 57 (ultimately Rule 60(b)), reprinted in MOORE'S,
supra note 7, at § 60 App. 102[3] (allowing relief for fraud upon proper motion); May 1936
Preliminary Draft of Rule 66 (ultimately Rule 60(b)), reprinted in MOORE'S, supra note 7,
at § 60 App. 102[2] (allowing relief for fraud and newly discovered evidence upon proper
motion).
101. Compare CAL. CIv. PRO. CODE § 473 (Deering 1937), with FED. R. Cirv. P. 60(b)
(1936) (superseded 1946), both reprinted in MOORE'S, supra note 7, at §§ 60 App. 10[1],
102[5].
102. FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b) (1937) (superseded 1946), reprinted in MOORE'S, supra note
7, at § 60 App. 10[1].
103. Id.
104. See Fiske v. Buder, 125 F.2d 841, 845 (8th Cir. 1942); Preveden v. Hahn, 36 F.
Supp. 952, 953-54 (S.D.N.Y. 1941); San Joaquin & Kings River Canal & Irrigation Co. v.
James J. Stevinson, 166 P. 338, 339-41 (Cal. 1917); Bacon v. Bacon, 89 P. 317, 321 (Cal.
1907); see also Moore & Rogers, supra note 57, at 633-34 (noting that California decisions
are persuasive in the interpretation of Original Rule 60(b)'s first two sentences).
105. See Fiske, 125 F.2d at 845; Bacon, 89 P. at 321; see also Moore & Rogers, supra
note 57, at 633-34.
106. See Fiske, 125 F.2d at 845; Bacon, 89 P. at 321; see also Moore & Rogers, supra
note 57, at 633-34.
107. Compare CAL. CIv. PRO. CODE § 473 (Deering 1937), with FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b)




to relieve a party from a judgment, order, or proceeding."10 8 While the
drafters most likely intended this savings clause to preserve the right of
the party to bring an independent action in equity, courts interpreted the
savings clause liberally to also include the ancient legal remedies (coram
nobis and audita querela) and the equitable remedies (bill of review and
bill in the nature of review) that allowed a court to review its judgments
after the term in which the court had rendered them expired. 10 9 Thus,
despite narrow drafting, the spectrum of judgment review available to
courts under Original Rule 60(b) was similar to previous practice. 110
Third, after the adoption of Original Rule 60(b), courts continued to
recognize their inherent power to vacate judgments for fraud upon the
court.1 11 Courts continued to vacate judgments for fraud committed by a
judicial officer (fraud on the court) or judgments that had been satisfied
or were void.112 These powers, being inherent, were not abrogated by the
Rule.1 1 3 Thus, the courts continued to review judgments well outside of
the time period prescribed by the Rules so long as the reason for review
fell within the courts' inherent powers. 114
In addition to creating.a simplified, albeit facially narrow, motion pro-
cedure to obtain relief from judgments, Original Rule 60(b), like its Cali-
fornia counterpart, set a firm time limit for seeking relief from judgments
by motion (as opposed to an independent action or fraud on the
court).1 1 5 Pursuant to this limitation, a party had to move for relief
within a "reasonable time," not to exceed six months after the judgment
was "taken. 11 6 This two-pronged approach-reasonableness accompa-
nied by an outside, firm time limit for motions-persists in the modern
Rule and provides a specific time period tempered by objective reasona-
bleness, by which a party should file motions for relief from judgments.1 1 7
By linking the deadline for seeking relief from the judgment to the time a
court entered a judgment, the Rule avoided the unfairness that could re-
sult from the previous term-based deadline. For instance, under the term
rule, a party seeking relief from a judgment that a court rendered at or
near the end of the term would have a very short time period to seek
108. Original Rule 60(b) also contained a second savings clause that allowed district
courts to set aside judgments obtained against a defendant who was not personally noti-
fied. See id.
109. See Wallace v. United States, 142 F.2d 240, 244 (2d Cir. 1944); Fraser v. Doing, 130
F.2d 617, 620 (D.C. Cir. 1942); Preveden, 36 F. Supp. at 953; see also Moore & Rogers,
supra note 57, at 633-35.
110. See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
111. See, e.g., Fiske, 125 F.2d at 849; Preveden, 36 F. Supp. at 953-54.
112. See, e.g., Tri-Cran, Inc. v. Fallon (In re Tri-Cran, Inc.), 98 B.R. 609, 624 (Bankr. D.
Mass. 1989).
113. Bucy v. Nev. Constr. Co., 125 F.2d 213, 216-17 (9th Cir. 1942).
114. See, e.g., Dausel v. Dausel, 195 F.2d 774, 775 (D.C. Cir. 1952).
115. FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b) (1937) (superseded 1946), reprinted in MOORE's, supra note
7, at § 60 App. 10[1].
116. See id.
117. Compare id., with FED. R. Civ. P. 60(c).
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relief.118 But a party seeking relief from a judgment rendered at the be-
ginning of a term would have a much longer time period to seek relief." 9
By fixing the deadline to seek relief from a judgment to each particular
judgment, the Rule provided an equal amount of time to seek relief from
each judgment. 120
Despite the improvements in post-judgment practice under the Rule,
criticism of the Rule took account of its notable deficiencies.' 2' In partic-
ular, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were supposed to simplify
practice.' 2 2 Instead, the liberally construed savings clause of Original
Rule 60(b) allowed complex ancient procedures to persist.1 23 According
to commentators, the Rule would be more effective if it abolished "both
the substance and procedure" of the old equitable and common law ancil-
lary remedies but left the independent action in place. 24 Doing so would
be workable, however, only if the Rule was amended to include fraud and
newly discovered evidence as bases for relief by motion within a specified
time period.' 25 Moreover, some viewed the six-month time limit as too
short and proposed extending it.126 By 1946, the Rules Advisory Com-
mittee considered these changes, among others, and recreated Rule 60(b)
in its modern incarnation. 127
C. MODERN RULE 60(b) CONSOLIDATES AND STREAMLINES
JUDGMENT RELIEF PRACTICE
After several draft proposals to amend Rule 60(b), the advisory com-
mittee amended the Rule on December 27, 1946.128 Before it was
restyled, the revised Rule read:
(b) Mistakes; Inadvertence; Excusable Neglect; Newly Discovered
Evidence; Fraud, Etc. On Motion and upon such terms as are just,
the court may relieve a party or his legal representative from a final
118. See FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b) (1937) (superseded 1946), reprinted in MOORE's, supra
note 7, at § 60 App. 10[1]; see also Moore & Rogers, supra note 57, at 628-29.
119. See supra note 118 and accompanying text.
120. See FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b) (1937) (superseded 1946), reprinted in MOORE'S, supra
note 7, at § 60 App. 10[1]; see also Moore & Rogers, supra note 57, at 628-29.
121. See FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b) advisory committee's note (1946) (citing Wallace v.
United States, 142 F.2d 240, 240 (2d Cir. 1944)), reprinted in MooRE's, supra note 7, at § 60
App. 11[2]; see also Moore & Rogers, supra note 57, at 685-93.
122. See FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b) advisory committee's note (1946), reprinted in MOORE'S,
supra note 7, at § 60 app. 11[2]; Moore & Rogers, supra note 57, at 685-86.
123. See supra note 122 and accompanying text.
124. See Moore & Rogers, supra note 57, at 692.
125. See FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b) advisory committee's note (1946), reprinted in MOORE'S,
supra note 7, at § 60 App. 11[2].
126. See Moore & Rogers, supra note 57, at 691-92.
127. FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b) advisory committee's note (1946), reprinted in MOORE'S,
supra note 7, at § 60 App. 11[2]. While the substance of Rule 60(b) has remained essen-
tially the same since the adoption of the 1946 amendments, the style of the Rule was al-
tered in the 2007 restyling of the Federal Rules. The restyling is discussed in more detail in
Part I.C, infra.
128. FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b) (1946) (superseded 2007), reprinted in MOORE'S, supra note
7, at § 60 App. 11[1].
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judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mis-
take, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discov-
ered evidence which by due diligence could not have been
discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59 (b); (3)
fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), mis-
representation, or other misconduct of an adverse party; (4) the
judgment is void; (5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or
discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is based has been re-
versed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the
judgment should have prospective application; or (6) any other rea-
son justifying relief from the operation of the judgment. The motion
shall be made within a reasonable time, and for reasons (1), (2), and
(3) not more than one year after the judgment, order, or proceeding
was entered or taken. A motion under this subdivision (b) does not
affect the finality of a judgment or suspend its operation. This rule
does not limit the power of a court to entertain an independent ac-
tion to relieve a party from a judgment, order, or proceeding, or to
grant relief to a defendant not actually personally notified as pro-
vided in Section 57 of the Judicial Code, USC, Title 28, § 118, or to
set aside a judgment for fraud upon the court. Writs coram nobis,
coram vobis, audita querela, and bills of review and bills in the na-
ture of a bill of review, are abolished, and the procedure for ob-
taining any relief from a judgment shall be made by motion as
prescribed in these rules or by an independent action. 129
The 1946 amendments to Rule 60(b) resolved several problems in
Original Rule 60(b). 130 These changes recognized that Original Rule
60(b) functioned fairly well, but it did not simplify and unify the proce-
dures for obtaining relief from a final judgment. 31 To accomplish this,
the committee made several key changes that unified and broadened
rule-based judgment relief practice. 132 First, Rule 60(b) was amended to
expressly include the full spectrum of substantive relief that was available
in federal courts before the adoption of Original Rule 60(b). 133 Second,
the Rule was amended to expressly include both intrinsic and extrinsic
fraud as a basis for relief by motion. 34 Third, the drafters changed the
Rule to allow relief by motion for newly discovered evidence that could
not, with reasonable diligence, have been discovered before the running
of the time to file a motion for new trial.135 Fourth, the six-month time
129. Id.
130. See id.
131. See FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b) advisory committee's note (1946), reprinted in MOORE'S,
supra note 7, at § 60 App. 11[2] ("It is obvious that the rules should be complete [as a rule
of procedure governing relief from judgments] and define practice with respect to any ex-
isting rights or remedies to obtain relief from final judgments.").
132. See FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b) (1946) (superseded 2007), reprinted in MOORE'S, supra
note 7, at § 60 App. 11[11.
133. See id.
134. Id. 60(b)(3); see also FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b) advisory committee's note (1946), re-
printed in MOORE'S, supra note 7, § 60 App. 11[2].
135. FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(2) (1946) (superseded 2007), reprinted in MOORE'S, supra
note 7, at § 60 App. 11[1]; see also FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b) advisory committee's note (1946).
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limit to file motions for mistake, etc. was extended to one year and ex-
panded to cover motions based on fraud (extrinsic or intrinsic) or newly
discovered evidence.136 Fifth, the drafters added subsections four and
five to allow relief on the basis that a judgment was void or should not
have prospective application because it had been discharged or satisfied
(or that it was no longer equitable to enforce the judgment), 137 and they
added subsection six, which allows a court to grant relief for "any other
reason."'1 38 Sixth, in light of the large expansion of grounds for relief
embodied in subsections two through six, the Rule abolished the old com-
mon law writs and equitable remedies available before adoption of the
Rule. 139 This had the effect of unifying all judgment relief practices
under Rule 60. Finally, the drafters clarified the savings clause to provide
for relief based on an independent action and not the other old writs and
equitable remedies, and they also added fraud on the court as a basis for
seeking relief.140 These changes had the effect of allowing relief from
judgments procured by both extrinsic and intrinsic fraud if the relief was
sought within one year. But outside of one year, relief from fraud was
available only by independent action, and the Rule did not abolish the
distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic fraud for independent ac-
tions.141 Thus, outside of one year, relief from judgments procured by
fraud was available only where the fraud was extrinsic.
Without changing the substance of the Rules, the Rules Advisory Com-
mittee "restyled" the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, including Rule
60(b), in 2007.142 The changes to Rule 60(b) were a "part of the general
restyling of the Civil Rules to make them more easily understood ....
[The] changes are intended to be stylistic only. ' 143 Thus, the substance of
the Rule remains largely unchanged from the 1946 amendments. 144 But
the Rule did get a facelift, primarily consisting of new section headings
and a new section-based organization. 145 In addition, the restyling de-
leted the last clause of the final sentence of Amended Rule 60(b) ("and
136. FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b) (1946); see also FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b) advisory committee's
note (1946), reprinted in MooRE's, supra note 7, at § 60 App. 11[2].
137. FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(4)-(5) (1946) (superseded 2007), reprinted in MOORE'S,
supra note 7, at § 60 App. 11[1]; see also FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b) advisory committee's note
(1946), reprinted in MooRE'S, supra note 7, at § 60 App. 11[2].
138. See FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b) (1946) (superseded 2007), reprinted in MOORE'S, supra
note 7, at § 60 App. 11[1].
139. Id. 60(b); see also FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b) advisory committee's note (1946), re-
printed in MOORE'S, supra note 7, at § 60 App. 11[2].
140. FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b) (1946) (superseded 2007), reprinted in MOORE'S, supra note
7, at § 60 App. 11[1]; see also FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b) advisory committee's note (1946),
reprinted in MooRE's, supra note 7, at § 60 App. 11[2].
141. FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b) (9146) (superseded 2007), reprinted in MooRE's, supra note
7, at § 60 App. 11[1]; see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) advisory committee's note (1946), re-
printed in MOORE'S, supra note 7, at § 60 app. 11[2].
142. FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b) (2007); see also FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b) advisory committee's
note (2007).
143. FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b) advisory committee's note (2007).
144. Compare FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b) (1946) (superseded 2007), reprinted in MOORE'S,
supra note 7, at § 60 App. 11[1], with FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b) (2007).
145. See FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b)-(e) (2007).
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the procedure for obtaining any relief from a judgment shall be made by
motion as prescribed in these rules or by an independent action") 146 as
"unnecessary," but the advisory committee's note specifically points out
that this deletion did not change the spectrum of relief available under
Rule 60.147 Restyled Rule 60(b) now reads:
(b) Grounds for Relief from a Final Judgment, Order, or Proceed-
ing. On motion and just terms, the court may relieve a party or its
legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for
the following reasons:
(1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect;
(2) newly discovered evidence that, with reasonable diligence,
could not have been discovered in time to move for a new
trial under Rule 59(b);
(3) fraud (whether previously called intrinsic or extrinsic), mis-
representation, or misconduct by an opposing party;
(4) the judgment is void;
(5) the judgment has been satisfied, released or discharged; it is
based on an earlier judgment that has been reversed or va-
cated; or applying it prospectively is no longer equitable; or
(6) any other reason that justifies relief.
(c) Timing and Effect of the Motion.
(1) Timing. A motion under Rule 60(b) must be made within a
reasonable time-and for reasons (1), (2), and (3) no more
than a year after the entry of the judgment or order or the
date of the proceeding.
(2) Effect on Finality. The motion does not affect the judgment's
finality or suspend its operation.
(d) Other Powers to Grant Relief. This rule does not limit a court's
power to:
(1) entertain an independent action to relieve a party from a
judgment, order, or proceeding;
(2) grant relief under 28 U.S.C. § 1655 to a defendant who was
not personally notified of the action; or
(3) set aside a judgment for fraud on the court.
(e) Bills and Writs Abolished. The following are abolished: bills of
review, bills in the nature of bills of review, and writs of coram nobis,
coram vobis, and audita querela. 148
The drafters did an excellent job of organizing a once-cluttered rule
into easily discernable subsections. In the spirit of this trend toward clar-
ity, and in the spirit of consistency, this Article will refer to modern,
restyled Rule 60(b) simply as "Rule 60(b)" or the appropriate Rule 60
subsection as those subsections are currently drafted. For instance, relief
by independent action is now available under Rule 60(d). 149 Accord-
146. See FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b) (1946) (superseded 2007), reprinted in MooRE's, supra
note 7, at § 60 App. 11[1].
147. FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b) advisory committee's note (2007).
148. FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b)-(e) (2007).
149. FED. R. Civ. P. 60(d) (2007).
2011]
SMU LAW REVIEW
ingly, the discussion related to independent actions will reference the
modern subsection.
III. RULE 60(d) INDEPENDENT ACTIONS PROVIDE
JUDGMENT RELIEF FOR INTERPARTY FRAUD CLAIMS
BROUGHT MORE THAN ONE YEAR AFTER
THE ENTRY OF JUDGMENT
Rule 60(b) provides relief from judgments for a broader range of
grounds than Original Rule 60(b), but a litigant seeking relief under sub-
sections one through three (mistake, fraud, newly discovered evidence,
etc.) of the provision must move within one year of the entry of judg-
ment. 150 The one-year deadline for these motions represents an exten-
sion of the six-month limitation under Original Rule 60(b). 151 While the
one-year limitation applies to motions predicated on subsections one
through three, a party must move for relief under subsections four
through six (void judgment, satisfied judgment, or any other reason)
within a "reasonable time."'1 52 And while subsection six seems to provide
for broad relief outside of one year, the provision has been construed to
provide relief only for motions based on grounds other than those ("any
other reason") expressly stated in subsections one through five. 153 In
other words, subsection six does not provide relief for motions based on
fraud, either intrinsic or extrinsic, outside of one year because those
grounds are expressly stated in the Rule and expressly covered by the
Rule's one-year time limitation. 54 Thus, while the extension of time to
file motions based on mistake, fraud, and newly discovered evidence
from six months to one year was a successful part of the overall effort to
liberalize and unify judgment relief practice under Rule 60(b), 55 it acts as
an unjust bar to relief for those who discover fraud or new evidence one
year and one day after the entry of judgment (and beyond). 156 As ex-
plained below, however, the Rule does preserve other mechanisms for
150. FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b), (c)(1) (2007); see also FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b) advisory com-
mittee's note (1946).
151. Compare FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b) (1946), with FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b), (c) (2007).
152. See FED. R. Civ. P. 60(c)(1) (2007).
153. See Klapprott v. United States, 335 U.S. 601, 613-16 (1949) (relieving party from
default judgment under 60(b)(6) where defaulting party was imprisoned when the default
was taken, noting that the circumstances were "extraordinary"); see also Mary Kay Kane,
Relief from Federal Judgments: A Morass Unrelieved by a Rule, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 41, 52-54
(1979).
154. See supra note 134 and accompanying text; see also Ackermann v. United States,
340 U.S. 193, 202 (1950) (refusing to relieve a party from judgment where grounds of a
60(b)(6) motion were appropriate under 60(b)(1), which is governed by a one year
limitation).
155. See FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b) advisory committee's note (1946), reprinted in MOORE'S,
supra note 7, at § 60 App. 1112]; see also Moore & Rogers, supra note 57, at 686-87, 691
(noting that the six month time period under Original Rule 60(b) was "probably too short"
and proposing an extension to one year).
156. See FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b), (c)(1) (2007); see also Robert D. Sharp, Relief from
Fraudulent Judgments in the Federal Courts: Motion to Vacate or Independent Action-
Opposite Sides of the Same Coin, 36 DRAKE L. REV. 389, 392, 407-08 (1987).
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seeking relief after one year has elapsed, most notably the independent
action in equity. 157 These procedures impose significant hurdles upon the
litigant seeking relief from a fraudulently procured judgment, including,
in some circuits, a bar on judgment relief claims based on intrinsic
fraud. 158
A. THE CIRCUITS ARE SPLIT ON WHETHER JUDGMENT RELIEF
IS AVAILABLE FOR INTRINSIC FRAUD CLAIMS
BROUGHT OUTSIDE OF ONE YEAR
Rule 60(b)(3) expressly dispenses with the distinction between extrin-
sic and intrinsic fraud for claims brought under Rule 60(b) within one
year from the entry of judgment.159 But in several circuits, the distinc-
tion, described as "shadowy, uncertain, and somewhat arbitrary," 160 has
survived for fraud claims brought in a Rule 60(d) independent action.161
Indeed, the subtle confusion created by Marshall has been amplified by
the decisions of lower courts that refuse to recognize the distinction be-
tween extrinsic and intrinsic fraud.162 And while most courts bar judg-
ment relief claims for intrinsic fraud brought outside of one year, one
notable Third Circuit case refused to limit relief only to cases of extrinsic
fraud.1 63 In Publicker v. Shallcross, a debtor compromised a claim of
$850,000 for one cent on the dollar by falsely representing that his assets
amounted to only $8,500.164 In reality, his assets totaled more than
$230,000 at the time he settled the claim. 165 Two years after the judg-
157. See FED. R. Civ. P. 60(d) (2007).
158. See Bankers Mortg. Co. v. United States, 423 F.2d 73, 79 (5th Cir. 1970) (citing
Nat'l Sur. Co. v. State Bank of Humboldt, Humboldt, Neb., 120 F. 593, 598 (8th Cir. 1903))
(explaining that in addition to fraud, a party seeking relief by equitable action must prove
additional, equitable requirements).
159. See FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(3) (2007).
160. Howard v. Scott, 125 S.W. 1158, 1166 (Mo. 1910); see also Diane E. Evans, Seeking
More Equitable Relief from Fraudulent Judgments: Abolishing the Extrinsic-Intrinsic Dis-
tinction, 12 PAC. L.J. 1013, 1022-25 (1981) (noting inconsistencies in application of the
distinction in various contexts).
161. Rule 60(d) also recognizes the Court's inherent authority to vacate a judgment for
fraud on the court. FED. R. Civ. P. 60(d)(3) (2007). The focus of this Article, however, is
interparty fraud. Although commentators have noted that some confuse extrinsic in-
terparty fraud with fraud on the court, see, e.g., Sharp, supra note 156, at 404-05, Rule
60(d) probably intended "fraud on the court" to reference a ground for relief (as opposed
to the independent action remedy). As a ground, fraud on the court is separate and apart
from the interparty fraud that may also be brought in an independent action. See id.; see
also MOORE'S, supra note 7, at § 60.81[1][b][v]; Clark, supra note 22, at 554-55.
162. See Averbach v. Rival Mfg. Co., 809 F.2d 1016, 1022-23 (3d Cir. 1987) ("[T]he
'extrinsic'-'intrinsic' distinction which is based on a statement in United States v.
Throckmorton ... was overruled, if it was ever the law, by Marshall v. Holmes.") (citations
omitted); see also Gleason v. Jandrucko, 860 F.2d 556, 558, 560 (2d Cir. 1988) (noting in
dicta that "relief from a judgment by way of an independent action need not be premised
on a showing of extrinsic as opposed to intrinsic fraud," but also recognizing that "the type
of fraud necessary to sustain an independent action attacking the finality of a judgment is
narrower in scope than that which is sufficient for relief by timely motion").
163. Publicker v. Shallcross, 106 F.2d 949, 950-52 (3d Cir. 1939).




ment, the receiver in the original action sought to vacate the judgment by
an independent action in equity. 166 The district court refused to enjoin
enforcement of the judgment, but the Third Circuit disagreed.
Noting that two lines of conflicting cases had emerged from the Su-
preme Court's decisions in Throckmorton and Marshall, the court held
that the extrinsic fraud requirement announced in Throckmorton should
be "modified in accordance with the more salutary doctrine of Marshall
v. Holmes."167 Accordingly, the Third Circuit reversed the district court
and granted relief to the receiver on the grounds that the original com-
promise was procured through perjured testimony, holding that, "[w]e
believe truth is more important than the trouble it takes to get it."'168
Most courts, however, continue to recognize the distinction between
intrinsic and extrinsic fraud. 169  And these courts observe
Throckmorton's original maxim in combination with the time limitations
of Rule 60(c)(1), holding that only proof of extrinsic fraud is sufficient to
relieve a party from the effects of a judgment that is more than one year
old. 170 In many cases, courts cite perjury as the classic example of intrin-
sic fraud and refuse to grant relief, consistent with the prevailing reading
of Throckmorton.171 Other courts have denied relief for discovery abuse
and misconduct.172 But even among the courts that continue to press the
limitation on independent actions premised on intrinsic fraud, there is a
recognition that the distinction is troubled. 173 For example, in a case in-
volving perjury, the Fourth Circuit noted "the considerable criticism lev-
eled against the intrinsic/extrinsic distinction and the debate regarding
the effect of [Marshall v. Holmes],"'174 but the court went on to hold that
relief would not lie for intrinsic fraud.'7 5 Thus, after nearly a century of
criticism, the distinction continues to vex courts and commentators. 176
166. See id.
167. Id. at 952.
168, Id.
169. See, e.g., Computer Leasco, Inc. v. NTP, Inc., 194 F. App'x 328, 336 (6th Cir. 2006);
Fierro v. Johnson, 197 F.3d 147, 155 (5th Cir. 1999); 2300 Elm Hill Pike, Inc. v. Orlando
Residence, Ltd., No. 97-6176, 1998 WL 808217, at *2 (6th Cir. Nov. 16, 1998); Lindo v. City
& Cnty. of S.F., Dep't of Soc. Servs., No. 94-15335, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 30620, at *34
(9th Cir. Oct. 31, 1994); Great Coastal Express, Inc. v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 675 F.2d
1349, 1358 (4th Cir. 1982); Wood v. McEwen, 644 F.2d 797, 801 (9th Cir. 1981); Hanna v.
Brictson Mfg. Co., 62 F.2d 139, 148 (8th Cir. 1932).
170. FED. R. Civ. P. 60(c)(1) (2007); see also, e.g., 2300 Elm Hill Pike, Inc., 1998 WL
808217, at *2.
171. See, e.g., George P. Reintjes Co., Inc. v. Riley Stoker Corp., 71 F.3d 44, 49 (1st Cir.
1995) (perjury not sufficient to support independent action); Great Coastal Express, Inc.,
675 F.2d at 1358 ("[J]t is clear that perjury and false testimony are not grounds for relief in
an independent action.").
172. Kahn v. Gen. Motors Corp., No. 88 CIV 2982, 1998 WL 812053, at *2 (S.D.N.Y.
Nov. 17, 1998), affd, 230 F.3d 1374 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (denying relief for "intrinsic" fraud
(discovery abuse and perjury)).
173. See Great Coastal Express, Inc., 675 F.2d at 1358.
174. Id.
175. See id.
176. While the focus of this Article is the type of fraud that is sufficient to entitle a
judgment-relief plaintiff to relief, it is generally accepted that fraud must be proven by
clear and convincing evidence to ultimately prevail on an attack on a judgment. See, e.g.,
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B. To OBTAIN RELIEF FROM A JUDGMENT THROUGH AN
INDEPENDENT ACTION, PARTIES MUST ESTABLISH
EQUITABLE REQUIREMENTS
Beyond proof of fraud as a ground for relief in an independent action,
courts require separate proof of several prerequisites to equitable re-
lief.177 The independent action prerequisites are often stated as follows:
(1) a judgment which ought not, in equity and good conscience, be en-
forced; (2) a good defense to the alleged cause of action on which the
judgment is founded; 178 (3) fraud, accident, or mistake which prevented
the defendant in the judgment from obtaining the benefit of his defense;
(4) the absence of fault or negligence on the part of defendant; and (5)
the absence of any remedy at law. 179
While this Article has dealt extensively with the requirement that a
party establish the proper type of fraud, the other requirements are no
less important.180 For example, courts have routinely held that a party
must establish that enforcement of a judgment would be "manifestly un-
conscionable" to obtain relief.181 In one modern case, United States v.
Gov't Fin. Servs. One Ltd. P'ship v. Peyton Place, Inc., 62 F.3d 767, 772 (5th Cir. 1995).
But the burden to obtain an evidentiary hearing on a fraud claim made in a Rule 60(b)
motion, however, is murkier. Compare Pearson v. First NH Mortg. Corp., 200 F.3d 30, 35
(1st Cir. 1999) (permitting evidentiary hearing when evidence of a "'colorable' claim of
fraud" exist), with Jones v. Ill. Cent. R.R. Co., 617 F.3d 843, 854 (6th Cir. 2010) (holding
that the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying evidentiary hearing because
there was no "clear" or "compelling" evidence of fraud). Cases that require something
akin to clear and convincing proof of fraud to obtain a hearing or discovery on a judgment
fraud claim ignore the obvious paradox of such a requirement: a judgment-relief plaintiff
seeking a hearing must have proof sufficient to satisfy the ultimate burden on the motion
(clear and convincing proof) before being allowed to have a hearing to gather such evi-
dence. In the Rule 60(b) motion context, this unduly high standard thwarts the purpose
and clear meaning of Rule 60 and is inconsistent with the pleading rules that govern inde-
pendent actions, creating a disparity between access to proof in motion cases and indepen-
dent action cases. See infra Parts IV, V. Likewise, in the independent action context,
requiring a judgment-relief plaintiff to produce clear and convincing evidence before al-
lowing them to proceed to discovery is inconsistent with the plausibility pleading standards
recently announced in Twombly and Iqbal. See id.
177. See MooRE's, supra note 7, at § 60.82[2]-[41; see also, Bankers Mortg. Co. v.
United States, 423 F.2d 73, 79 (5th Cir. 1970); LinkCo, Inc. v. Akikusa, 615 F. Supp. 2d 130,
139 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (party must establish certain prerequisites to be entitled to equitable
relief through the Rule 60(d)(1) independent action at equity); Study v. United States, No.
1:10-CV-0153-WTL-DHL, 2010 WL 1881947, at *2 (S.D. Ind. May 7, 2010) (same).
178. While the element of a good defense remains a part of most descriptions of the
independent action elements, its significance in modern practice, outside of the default
judgment context, is unclear. See, e.g., MOORE'S, supra note 7, at § 60.82[1] ("[V]irtually
no modern cases deal[ ] with the requirement."). In any event, a party must, at the least,
establish that the fraud prevented it from prevailing on the merits.
179. See Travelers Indem. Co. v. Gore, 761 F.2d 1549, 1551 (11th Cir. 1985); Bankers
Mortg. Co. v. United States, 423 F.2d 73, 79 (5th Cir. 1970).
180. Cf. LinkCo, 615 F. Supp. 2d at 139 (party seeking relief from judgment procured
by fraudulent inducement barred from relief because lack of diligence and unexcused delay
preclude 60(d)(1) independent action relief).
181. See United States v. Beggerly, 524 U.S. 38, 46 (1998) ("[I]njustices which, in cer-
tain instances, are deemed sufficiently gross to demand a departure from rigid adherence
to the doctrine of res judicata.") (internal quotations omitted); Pickford v. Talbott, 225
U.S. 651, 658 (1912); see also MOORE'S, supra note 7, at § 60.82[4].
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Beggerly, the Supreme Court refused to grant relief to a party that
claimed the United States failed to produce relevant documents in the
underlying action. 182 If Rule 60(b) (which now includes 60(b)-(e)) "is to
be interpreted as a coherent whole, [relief by independent action must]
be reserved for those cases of 'injustices which, in certain instances, are
deemed sufficiently gross to demand a departure' from rigid adherence to
the doctrine of res judicata.' 8 3 Accordingly, a failure to produce rele-
vant documents did not rise to a "grave miscarriage of justice"' 84 suffi-
cient to warrant relief. In contrast, the Court cited Marshall approvingly,
in dicta, for the proposition that enforcing a judgment based on a forged
document is a sufficiently grave miscarriage of justice to entitle a party to
relief.185 Thus, the alleged injustice that is the subject of the independent
action must be egregious, manifestly unconscionable, or a grave miscar-
riage of justice to entitle a party to relief.186
The plaintiff in an independent action must be free from fault and neg-
ligence. 187 Where parties are fully or partially to blame for the problem
judgment, they may not seek relief through an independent action.1 88
For example, when a party's attorney fails to diligently investigate and
pursue all available evidence at or before trial, that party will be barred
from seeking relief if it discovers evidence after trial.189 A party must
exercise diligence to uncover frauds and misrepresentations at or before
trial-not after trial.190 Failure to exercise diligence in uncovering the
underhanded actions of opposing counsel or parties will bar relief by in-
dependent action.191 Likewise, when a party or her attorney is negligent
or fails to diligently pursue available legal remedies based on known
problems with a judgment under Rule 60(b) (like a Rule 60(b)(3) motion
based on fraud or mistake) within one year of judgment, the party cannot
later complain through the Rule 60(d) independent action.192 Beyond
fault and negligence, a party who seeks relief from a judgment by inde-
182. Beggerly, 524 U.S. at 46.
183. Id. (citing Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. Hartford-Empire Co., 322 U.S. 238, 244
(1944)).
184. Id. at 47.
185. Id. Beggerly showcases the high burden placed on a litigant to obtain relief
through an independent action, but some commentators still think the bar is not high
enough. Indeed, at least one commentator proposes that current limitations are not suffi-
cient and proposes more stringent restrictions on post-one-year relief from judgments. See
Temple, supra note 16, at 979.
186. See Beggerly, 524 U.S. at 46; see also MOORE'S, supra note 7, at § 60.82[4].
187. See Carteret Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Jackson, 812 F.2d 36, 40 (1st Cir. 1987) (inde-
pendent action did not lie because of failure to establish lack of negligence in challenge to
judgment enabling yacht sale); see also LinkCo, Inc. v. Akikusa, 615 F. Supp. 2d 130, 139
(S.D.N.Y. 2009) (failure to act diligently precludes independent action). See generally
MOORE'S, supra note 7, at § 60.82[2].
188. See Jackson, 812 F.2d at 40.
189. See Pickford v. Talbott, 225 U.S. 651, 660 (1912).
190. See id.
191. See id. at 660; see also MOORE'S, supra note 7, at § 60.82[2].
192. See, e.g., Jackson, 812 F.2d at 39 (noting that an independent action "presupposes
absence of fault or negligence"); see also MOORE'S, supra note 7, at § 60.82.
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pendent action must have clean hands. 193
An independent action is appropriate only where there is no adequate
remedy at law. 194 Within one year of judgment, a Rule 60(b)(1)-(6) mo-
tion allows relief on almost any grounds.195 Thus, an independent action
may be dismissed if filed within one year, when other Rule 60(b) reme-
dies are available. 196 But commentators have also noted that the more
appropriate course for a court to take is to ignore the title on indepen-
dent actions filed within one year and instead look to the pleading's sub-
stance to determine whether it is an appropriate Rule 60(b) motion.197 If
so, then the court may consider the erroneously filed independent action
as a motion and reach its merits.198
Laches works to bar independent actions where the plaintiff's delay in
filing the action causes undue prejudice to the other party. 199 There is no
express time limitation on independent actions in Rule 60.200 Rather, the
drafters intended that the time limitations that apply to all equitable ac-
tions apply equally to independent actions. 201 Thus, the equitable time-
bar doctrine "laches" has been applied to independent actions in eq-
uity.20 2 Laches bars relief where a party has not exercised diligence in
pursuing a claim or remedy and the opposing party has been prejudiced
by this delay.20 3 For example, where a party delays bringing a claim and a
witness dies in the intervening time, prejudicing the opposing party,
laches may bar relief.20 4 Laches is just one of many equitable limitations
that constrain independent actions.205 These limitations present substan-
tial hurdles to a litigant seeking relief from a judgment more than one
year after it was entered.20 6 The first of these hurdles comes when a liti-
gant files the first pleading.
193. See MOORE'S, supra note 7, at § 60.82[2].
194. See, e.g., Bankers Mortg. Co. v. Unites States, 423 F.2d 73, 79 (5th Cir. 1970).
195. FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b).
196. See MOORE'S, supra note 7, at § 60.82[31 (citing Taft v. Donellan Jerome, Inc., 407
F.2d 807, 808-09 (7th Cir. 1969)).
197. See id.
198. See id. § 60.60[3].
199. See, e.g., In re Whitney-Forbes, Inc., 770 F.2d 692, 698 (7th Cir. 1985) ("The doc-
trine of laches applies to such [independent] actions.").
200. See FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b)-(e).
201. See WRIGHT, MILLER & KANE, supra note 24, at § 2868 (noting that laches places
a temporal limitation on independent actions).
202. See id. The advisory committee also noted that "statutes of limitations" might
apply to independent actions, but there are no relevant statutes of limitations that apply.
See FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b) advisory committee's note (1946), reprinted in MOORE'S, supra
note 7, at § 60 App. 11[1].
203. See, e.g., Ambramson v. Superintendence Co. (In re Casco Chem. Co.), 335 F.2d
645, 651 (5th Cir. 1964) (Laches is "time plus prejudicial harm, and the harm is not merely
that one loses what he otherwise would have kept, but that delay has subjected him to a
disadvantage in asserting and establishing his claimed right or defense.") (citation
omitted).
204. WRIGHT, MILLER & KANE, supra note 24, at § 2868.




IV. RULE 9(b) REQUIRES PARTICULARIZED FRAUD
PLEADING, WHILE TWOMBLY AND IQBAL REQUIRE
PLAUSIBLE PLEADING UNDER RULE 8
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 8 and 9 set forth the rules for pleading
general and special matters. Rule 9(b), in particular, establishes special,
heightened standards for pleading fraud claims.20 7 Rule 8(a)(2) requires
"a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is enti-
tled to relief" for all pleadings stating a claim for relief.208 Twombly and
Iqbal recently announced new, heightened requirements for pleadings
subject to Rule 8(a)(2). 20 9 Importantly, a judgment-relief plaintiff's
pleading must satisfy both rules to survive dismissal. 210
A. RULE 9(b) REQUIRES PARTICULARIZED FRAUD PLEADING
Rule 9(b) requires specific averments of the time, place, and content of
any fraud allegation, 211 including fraud allegations in independent ac-
tions. 212 Indeed, unlike the general pleading requirements for most
claims,213 allegations of "the circumstances constituting fraud"2 14 must be
stated with heightened particularity.2 15 Thus, a complaint that merely
states conclusory allegations, or allegations that do not contain specific
facts, in support of a claim for fraud will not survive a motion to dis-
miss. 2 16 In most cases, a party must allege, with specificity, the identity of
the person who made a misrepresentation or omission, the content of the
misrepresentation, the place of the misrepresentation, and the date and
207. FED. R. Civ. P. 9.
208. FED. R. Civ. P. 8.
209. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949-50 (2009).
210. See infra Part IV.B.
211. FED. R. Civ. P. 9(b); DiLeo v. Ernst & Young, 901 F.2d 624, 627 (7th Cir. 1990)
(Rule 9(b) "requires the plaintiff to state 'with particularity' any 'circumstances constitut-
ing fraud.' [ ]This means the who, what, when, where, and how: the first paragraph of any
newspaper story.").
212. See Lone Star Ladies Inv. Club v. Schlotzsky's Inc., 238 F.3d 363, 368 (5th Cir.
2001) ("Rule 9(b) applies by its plain language to all averments of fraud, whether they are
part of a claim of fraud or not."); see also MOORE'S, supra note 7, at § 9.03[1][d].
213. FED. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). But see lqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949 (overruling the notice
pleading standards set out in Conley v. Gibson and increasing the plaintiff's pleading bur-
den in all civil actions). Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 554-55 (2007). Twombly
and Iqbal and their impact on pleading standards are discussed infra.
214. FED. R. Civ. P. 9(b).
215. Lone Star, 238 F.3d at 368; see also Mills v. Polar Molecular Corp., 12 F.3d 1170,
1175 (2d Cir. 1993) ("Rule 9(b) ... requires that fraud be pled with particularity. Specifi-
cally, the complaint must: (1) specify the statements that the plaintiff contends were fraud-
ulent, (2) identify the speaker, (3) state where and when the statements were made, and (4)
explain why the statements were fraudulent.") (citation omitted). But see Walling v. Bev-
erly Enters., 476 F.2d 393, 397 (9th Cir. 1973) ("[R]ule 9(b) does not require nor make
legitimate the pleading of detailed evidentiary matter. Nor does Rule 9(b) require any
particularity in connection with an averment of intent, knowledge or condition of the mind.
It only requires the identification of the circumstances constituting fraud so that the defen-
dant can prepare an adequate answer from the allegations.") (internal quotations omitted)
(citation omitted).
216. See DiLeo, 901 F.2d at 627.
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time of the misrepresentation. 217 A bare bones allegation of fraud, ac-
cordingly, is insufficient under Rule 9.218
Likewise, a fraud claim founded on "information and belief" will not
withstand Rule 9(b) scrutiny.219 While allegations made on information
and belief will satisfy the general requirements of Rule 8 in some in-
stances, the heightened pleading requirements of Rule 9(b) require
more. 220 In some limited instances, however, information and belief
pleading may withstand Rule 9 scrutiny.221 For instance, where a plaintiff
does not have access to proof of fraud because that proof is "peculiarly"
within the defendant's possession, the Rule's heightened requirements
may be relaxed to a certain extent.222
While Rule 9 mandates heightened scrutiny of allegations of the "cir-
cumstances constituting fraud," state-of-mind allegations may be pleaded
generally under Rule 9.223 Indeed, Rule 9 expressly notes that "[m]alice,
intent, knowledge, and other conditions of a person's mind may be al-
leged generally. '224 Thus, a party may generally allege that a person in-
tentionally misrepresented a factual matter without the heightened
specificity required of other fraud-based allegations.225 Rule 9(b)'s state-
of-mind pleading requirements are akin to Rule 8's general pleading stan-
dard,226 but "the relaxation of [the Rule's] specificity requirement for sci-
enter must not be mistaken for license to base claims of fraud on
speculation and conclusory allegations. '227
The purpose of the heightened fraud pleading requirements is to pre-
vent plaintiffs from engaging in a "fishing expedition" to find proof of
unfounded allegations through discovery.228 According to this reasoning,
an allegation of fraud against a business is so potentially damaging that a
fraud lawsuit should be subject to dismissal at the earliest stage in the
217. See id.
218. See, e.g., id.
219. See, e.g., Segal v. Gordon, 467 F.2d 602, 608 (2d Cir. 1972) ("Rule 9(b) pleadings
cannot be based on information and belief.") (internal quotations omitted).
220. See id. at 608.
221. See, e.g., Schlick v. Penn-Dixie Cement Corp., 507 F.2d 374, 379 (2d Cir. 1974),
overruled on other grounds by Va. Bankshares, Inc. v. Sandberg, 501 U.S. 1083, 1100 n.9
(1991).
222. See id. Additionally, information and belief pleading may support the state of
mind allegations in a fraud complaint because those allegations are specifically exempted
from Rule 9(b)'s particularity requirements. FED. R. Civ. P. 9(b).
223. See FED. R. Civ. P. 9(b).
224. Id.
225. See, e.g., Cramer v. Gen. Tel. & Elecs. Corp., 582 F.2d 259, 273 (3d Cir. 1978)
(noting that the scienter pleading requirements of 9(b) are "minimal").
226. See id. at 272-73. Neither Twombly nor Iqbal directly addressed Rule 9(b)'s scien-
ter pleading standards, but courts have long recognized that Rules 8 and 9 must be read
together. See United States v. Nat'l Training & Info. Ctr., Inc., 532 F. Supp. 2d 946, 960
(N.D. Ill. 2007) ("[T]he particularity requirement of Rule 9(b) must be read together with
the liberal notice pleading standard of Rule 8.").
227. See Shields v. Citytrust Bankcorp, Inc., 25 F.3d 1124, 1128 (2d Cir. 1994) (internal
quotations omitted).
228. See United States ex rel. Franklin v. Parke-Davis, Div. of Warner-Lambert Co., 147
F. Supp. 2d 39, 46 (D. Mass. 2001).
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litigation if the allegation is vague.229 Some plaintiffs have used allega-
tions of fraud to damage a business or individual with the mere filing of a
lawsuit. 230 Rule 9(b)'s requirements recognize this danger and allow
courts to dismiss unfounded suits. 231 Of course the damage from real
fraud is also very substantial to the party who is defrauded and a lawsuit
may be a person's only recourse. Also, by raising the pleading bar on
fraud claims, Rule 9(b) runs the risk of closing the courthouse door on
persons who have been grievously injured. Despite this risk, courts have
vigorously enforced Rule 9's heightened standard to dismiss complaints
with inadequate, general allegations of fraud. 232
B. NEW "PLAUSIBILITY" PLEADING STANDARDS GOVERN THE
REMAINING INDEPENDENT ACTION ALLEGATIONS
Beyond fraud allegations, a party seeking relief by independent action
must plead sufficient allegations to support the remaining equitable ele-
ments of the independent action.233 And while Rule 9(b) governs allega-
tions of fraud and requires particularity in their pleading, Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 8 governs the other allegations in the independent ac-
tion.234 Rule 8 requires that a party's initial pleading contain "a short and
plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to re-
lief."'2 35 For instance, as discussed above, parties seeking relief from a
judgment by independent action based on fraud must allege that they
acted diligently to discover the fraud.2 36 The allegations of fraud itself
are controlled by Rule 9(b)'s particularity requirements,2 37 but the dili-
gence allegation is controlled by the less onerous "short and plain state-
ment" requirements of Rule 8(a)(2).2 38 What constitutes a short and
plain statement showing that the pleader is entitled to relief? The answer
has changed dramatically in recent years. 239
229. See id.; see also Hernandez v. Ciba-Geigy Corp. USA, 200 F.R.D. 285, 290 (S.D.
Tex. 2001) ("Rule 9(b) was formulated to ensure that defendants can effectively respond to
plaintiffs' allegations, to prevent the filing of baseless complaints to obtain discovery on
unknown wrongs, and to protect defendants from unfounded allegations of wrongdoing
which might injure their reputations.").
230. See, e.g., DiVittorio v. Equidyne Extractive Indus., Inc., 822 F.2d 1242, 1247 (2d
Cir. 1987) (Rule 9(b) was designed, in part, to minimize strike suits.).
231. See id.
232. See, e.g., Lone Star Ladies Inv. Club v. Schlotzsky's Inc., 238 F.3d 363, 368 (5th Cir.
2001).
233. See, e.g., LinkCo, Inc. v. Akikusa, 615 F. Supp. 2d 130, 133, 139 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).
234. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1953 (2009). Rule 8 "governs the pleading
standard 'in all civil actions and proceedings in United States district courts."' Id. (citing
FED. R. Civ. P. 1).
235. FED. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2).
236. See supra notes 189-92 and accompanying text.
237. See Cramer v. Gen. Tel. & Elecs. Corp., 582 F.2d 259, 273 (3d Cir. 1978). Of
course, as discussed, state-of-mind allegations may be averred generally. Id.; see also supra
notes 211-32 and accompanying text.
238. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1953 (2009) (citing FED. R. Civ. P. 1); see
also FED. R. Civ. P. 8.
239. See, e.g., Tiscareno v. Anderson, 639 F.3d 1016, 1025 (10th Cir. 2011), vacated on
other grounds, 2011 WL 1549519 (Apr. 26, 2011).
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After the adoption of the Civil Rules, Rule 8's requirements were in-
terpreted as a "notice pleading" requirement.240 The standard for a
proper notice pleading was famously set out by the Supreme Court in
Conley v. Gibson.241 The Court observed that "the accepted rule that a
complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it
appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in sup-
port of his claim which would entitle him to relief. ' 242 This formulation
of the notice pleading standard supported the well-accepted idea that
cases should be decided on the merits, not on technical errors in the
pleadings.243 Indeed, a pleading was an opportunity to connect allega-
tions of wrongdoing to a particular defendant to put that defendant on
notice of the pending claims.244 And while the notice pleading standard
allowed plaintiffs a wide berth into the tribunal, subsequent mcrit-based
procedures like summary judgment could always stop a case from pro-
ceeding to trial.245 These procedures were preferable to a dismissal on
the pleadings because they were based, at minimum, on a discovery re-
cord that presumably reflected the merits of the case. Thus, under the
notice pleading interpretation of Rule 8, courts were more likely to de-
cide a case on its underlying merits than on the technical mistakes of
counsel.2 46 Two recent Supreme Court decisions have turned this para-
digm on its head and redefined what constitutes a sufficient pleading in
federal civil cases. 247
After fifty years of federal courts operating under the notice pleading
standard announced in Conley v. Gibson, the Supreme Court revisited
Rule 8's pleading requirements in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly.248 The
case arose in the context of a motion to dismiss an antitrust complaint. 249
The class action plaintiffs alleged that after the breakup of the AT&T
telephone company, the remnants of the company (the "Baby Bells")
conspired or combined to thwart competitors and refrain from encroach-
240. See, e.g., Kittay v. Kornstein, 230 F.3d 531, 541 (2d Cir. 2000) ("Under [Rule 8's]
liberal pleading standards, a plaintiff must disclose sufficient information to permit the
defendant to have a fair understanding of what the plaintiff is complaining about and to
know whether there is a legal basis for recovery.") (internal quotations omitted).
241. See generally Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957), abrogated by Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
242. Id. at 45-46.
243. See id. at 48 ("The Federal Rules reject the approach that pleading is a game of
skill in which one misstep by counsel may be decisive to the outcome and accept the princi-
ple that the purpose of pleading is to facilitate a proper decision on the merits."); see also
Arthur R. Miller, From Conley to Twombly to Iqbal: A Double Play on the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure, 60 DUKE L.J. 1, 18 (2010) (noting that a "bend-over-backwards princi-
ple" favored the pleader during the notice pleading regime).
244. See MOORE'S, supra note 7, at § 8.04[1][a] (citing Brownlee v. Conine, 957 F.2d
353, 354 (7th Cir. 1992) (Posner, J.)).
245. See FED. R. Cv. P. 56.
246. See generally Conley, 355 U.S. at 48.
247. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1940 (2009); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 544 (2007).
248. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557.
249. Id. at 549.
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ing on each other's traditional, geographically defined markets. 250 The
plaintiffs alleged that the Baby Bells' conspiracy was evidenced by paral-
lel conduct (meaning similar or identical business conduct). 251 According
to the plaintiffs' complaint, over the course of time, the Baby Bells en-
gaged in parallel conduct that discouraged their competitors. 252 This con-
duct included engaging in anticompetitive billing practices, providing
inferior network connections, and propagating unfair agreements that all
undermined the competition.253 Moreover, the complaint alleged that
the Baby Bells did not conduct business in each other's traditional geo-
graphic markets despite congressional authorization to do so. 254
The Baby Bells moved for a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal, and the district
court granted the motion, holding that the plaintiffs did not plead suffi-
cient facts to support the Sherman Act's conspiracy requirement. 255 In
particular, the district court held that mere allegations of parallel conduct
do not support an "inference that [the Baby Bells'] actions were the re-
sult of a conspiracy. '256 The court of appeals reversed the district court
holding that a dismissal would be appropriate only where a district court
could conclude that "there is no set of facts that would permit a plaintiff
to demonstrate that the particular parallelism asserted was the product of
collusion rather than coincidence. '257 The Supreme Court granted certi-
orari "to address the proper standard for pleading an antitrust conspiracy
through allegations of parallel conduct" and reversed the court of
appeals.258
The Supreme Court recognized that the circuit court's confusion
stemmed from the long-standing and oft-cited holding of Conley v. Gib-
son.259 The Court overruled Conley and held that Rule 8 requires more
than a statement that makes a cause of action conceivable. 260 Rather, a
plaintiff must plead facts that show that a claim is "plausible on its
face. '26 1 While the Supreme Court stated that it was not requiring
"heightened fact pleading of specifics," it went on to reverse the court of
appeals.262 The Court reasoned that while the plaintiffs' allegations of
parallel conduct made it conceivable that the Baby Bells engaged in a
conspiracy, the allegations did not make it plausible that the Baby Bells
did so. 263
250. See id. at 550-51.
251. See id. at 551.
252. See id.
253. See id.
254. See id. at 550-51.
255. See id. at 552.
256. Id.
257. Id. at 553.
258. See id.
259. See id. at 554-55.
260. See id. at 563.
261. See id. at 556, 566-70.




After the Court decided Twombly, some confusion remained about the
applicability of the heightened Rule 8 pleading standards outside of the
antitrust context. In Ashcroft v. Iqbal, these questions were definitively
answered.264 In Iqbal, a Muslim, Pakistani man was arrested and de-
tained in the wake of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks.265 Iqbal
complained that while in custody for immigration violations, he was sub-
jected to harsh treatment and conditions, including beatings, harassment,
and repeated strip searches and body-cavity searches based on the fact
that he was a Muslim. 266 The particular conditions of Iqbal's captivity
stemmed from officials in the United States Justice Department designat-
ing him as a "person of high interest" in the September 11th
investigation. 267
After his release from prison, Iqbal filed a Bivens action against a host
of federal officials and corrections officers. 268 Among the defendants
were John Ashcroft, former United States Attorney General, and Robert
Mueller, Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. 269 Iqbal
claimed that Ashcroft and Mueller "designated him a person of high in-
terest on account of his race, religion, or national origin in contravention
of the First and Fifth Amendments to the Constitution. '270 Moreover,
the complaint claimed that Ashcroft and Mueller knowingly condoned
Iqbal's harsh treatment while in confinement "solely on account of [his]
religion, race, and/or national origin and for no legitimate penological
interest." 271
Ashcroft and Mueller moved to dismiss Iqbal's complaint for failure to
state sufficient allegations to show that they participated in the unconsti-
tutional conduct, and the district court denied the motion.272 Ashcroft
and Mueller appealed, and in the intervening time, the Supreme Court
decided Twombly.273 The United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit decided that the claims in Iqbal were not subject to Twombly's
plausibility requirement and affirmed the district court's denial of the
motion to dismiss. The Supreme Court granted certiorari 274 and reversed
the court of appeals, holding that Twombly's plausibility requirement ap-
plied to any complaint subject to Rule 8(a)(2). 275 The Court went on to
note that evaluating a complaint under Rule 8 requires a two-step analy-
sis. 276 First, a court must disregard conclusory legal allegations in the
264. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1942 (2009).
265. Id. at 1942.
266. See id. at 1944.
267. See id. at 1943
268. Id. at 1942.
269. Id.




274. See id. at 1944-45.
275. See id. at 1949-51.
276. See id. at 1949-50.
2011]
SMU LAW REVIEW
complaint.277 Second, and after disregarding allegations stated as legal
conclusions, a court should evaluate the remaining factual allegations to
determine if they state a plausible claim for relief.278 If the facts merely
allege the "possibility" that a plaintiff is entitled to relief and do not show
that the claim is plausible, the court should dismiss the complaint.2 79 Us-
ing this framework, the Court disregarded Iqbal's allegations that Ash-
croft and Mueller "knew of, condoned, and willfully and maliciously
agreed to" 280 the conditions of his confinement because of Iqbal's race,
religion, or national origin because the Court viewed them as bare legal
conclusions not entitled to the presumption of truth given to factual alle-
gations in a complaint. 281 After disregarding these allegations, the Court
evaluated the remaining allegations in the complaint, found that they did
not establish a plausible claim of discrimination by Ashcroft and Mueller,
and dismissed the complaint. 282
Through Iqbal and Twombly, the Supreme Court made clear that Rule
8 requires a party to plead factual allegations that make a claim for relief
plausible.283 This heightened standard raises the bar for all potential
plaintiffs attempting to plead a claim subject to the Rule. Likewise, Rule
9 sets a high standard for any plaintiff attempting to plead a fraud claim.
Combined, these standards are critically important to any party seeking
relief from a judgment under Rule 60(d).
V. BECAUSE THE VALUE OF TRUTH OUTWEIGHS THE
RISK OF MERITLESS JUDGMENT-RELIEF LITIGATION, THE
DISTINCTION BETWEEN INTRINSIC AND EXTRINSIC
FRAUD SHOULD BE ELIMINATED
The distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic fraud strikes the wrong
balance between judgments that reflect the truth and judgments that are
final. Truth is an essential feature of a properly functioning judicial sys-
tem. Truth, however, is uncovered by the legal system only when issues
and disputes are fully and fairly litigated. Indeed, if a party is prevented
by the wrongdoing of another party from presenting a claim or defense in
court, then the fact finder cannot effectively get to the truth.284 Such
situations are especially problematic because society relies on courts to
277. See id.
278. See id.
279. See id. at 1950.
280. Id. at 1951.
281. See id. at 1950-51. The Court also disregarded allegations that Ashcroft was the
"principal architect" and that Mueller was "instrumental" in carrying out this plan. See id.
282. See id. at 1951-54. But see, Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. v. Siracusano, 131 S. Ct. 1309,
1323 (2011) (holding that plaintiff's allegations of materiality in a securities fraud case were
plausible pursuant to Twombly and Iqbal).
283. See Miller, supra note 243, at 17-20; see also Edward A. Hartnett, Taming
Twombly, Even after lqbal, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 473, 480-83 (2010).
284. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 70 cmt. a (1982) ("Judgments are
taken as finally determining claims because of confidence that the procedure leading to
judgment is reasonably effective to ascertain the merits of the controversy."); Harold C.
Dedman, Note, Intrinsic and Extrinsic Fraud and Relief Against Judgments, 4 VAND. L.
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resolve disputes in a truthful manner. Judgments have long been viewed
as the court system's final pronouncement on and resolution of disputed
issues of fact.2 85 Individuals shape their behavior to avoid legal troubles
on the belief that if they are accused of wrongdoing, they may rely on the
court system to reveal that their actions did indeed comport with the law.
Likewise, when someone commits a legal wrong, society relies on the
court system to impose liability based on the wrongdoer's real world ac-
tions. Thus, whether the ultimate outcome is vindication or condemna-
tion, the function of a judgment is, in large part, to accurately and
truthfully account for actions in the real world.286
The value of truth, however, is tempered by the real need for litigation
to come to an end. Litigants do not, and should not, expect that the
courts provide a forum for a never-ending quest for ultimate truth on any
issue.287 Rather, the courts come into a conflict at a defined point in time
and exit the conflict at a point sometime after its resolution. This fixed-
window model allows for the efficient use of both the courts' time and the
litigants' time. The litigation process is controlled through scheduling or-
ders and trial settings and ultimately comes to an end through a final
judgment or order.
The virtues of ending disputes and the finality of judgments are well-
known.2 88 Finality allows the litigants to go on with their lives. It also
allows the court system to allocate resources to new disputes in need of
resolution. The final judgment fixes the rights of the parties and allows
them to proceed according to the court-imposed obligations contained in
it. Additionally, in the common law system, final judgments and the ap-
pellate opinions that sometimes follow them dictate the rights and obliga-
tions of individuals who were not part of the litigation. And, final
judgments allow society to conduct itself according to the status quo,
preventing continual rancor and discord.
Res judicata attempts to strike a proper balance between these con-
cepts, recognizing that finality is important, but that truth can flow only
REV. 338, 338 (1951) (Relief is appropriate where "there has never been a real contest
before the court on the subject matter of the suit.").
285. The principle of finality's "enforcement is essential to the maintenance of social
order; for the aid of judicial tribunals would not be invoked for the vindication of rights of
person and property, if, as between parties and their privies, conclusiveness did not attend
the judgments of such tribunals in respect of all matters properly put at issue and actually
determined by them." S. Pac. R.R. v. United States, 168 U.S. 1, 49 (1897); see also Moore
& Rogers, supra note 57, at 624.
286. See WRIGHT, MILLER & KANE, supra note 24, at § 2852 ("Rule 60 is to be liberally
construed in order that judgments will reflect the true merits of the case."); see also
Dedman, supra note 284, at 338.
287. See Temple, supra note 16, at 968-70.
288. Judgment finality undoubtedly plays an important role in uncovering the truth
through litigation. Indeed, finality incentivizes parties to put on their best case during the
first, and typically only, presentation of evidence at trial. In some cases, however, a liti-
gant's best efforts to try her case are undermined by perjury, discovery abuse, or an oppos-
ing litigant's otherwise nefarious conduct. In these instances finality serves as a barrier to




when disputed issues are actually presented to the tribunal.289 Where an
issue was, or should have been, raised between the same parties in a pre-
vious proceeding, the order disposing of that issue cannot be disturbed.290
But if the issue was not, or could not, have been raised, res judicata al-
lows a litigant the opportunity to raise the claim and seek truth on the
matter.29
1
The Supreme Court attempted to strike a similar balance between
truth and finality when it created the distinction between intrinsic and
extrinsic fraud. In Throckmorton, the Supreme Court held that relief by
independent action was not available for judgments obtained by intrinsic
fraud, including fraud perpetrated through perjured testimony and falsi-
fied documents.292 By doing so, the Court spawned a rudimentary sort-
ing mechanism for independent actions based on the likelihood that those
actions would result in the relitigation of an issue that had been, or
should have been, resolved in the original lawsuit. According to this rea-
soning, allegations of perjury and document falsification levied against
testimony and documents examined by a fact-finder at the original trial
should not be subject to a second inquiry. Although not expressly a part
of the Court's reasoning in Throckmorton, the rule was consistent with
the premise that allegations of perjury are easily fabricated by a losing
party, endlessly perpetuating the litigation in a never ending he-said-she-
said.293 Likewise, claims of document falsification might be drummed up
by any losing party through a single witness. To promote finality, these
easily concocted claims were stopped at the courthouse door by the
Court's bar on intrinsic fraud.294 Claims predicated on extrinsic fraud,
however, were allowed to go forward because the complaining party, by
some rough measure, did not have an opportunity to present the claim in
the first instance. 295 This sorting mechanism is predicated on the idea
that we should not reopen a case when the type or category of fraud usu-
ally had been or should have been examined at the original trial.296 The
mechanism attempted to strike a balance between the truth-seeking func-
tion of litigation and the value of not endlessly repeating litigation of the
same issues. 297 But the distinction was difficult to apply from the begin-
ning and became less practical and equitable as the decades passed. 298
Unfortunately, lower courts that adopted Throckmorton used the dis-
tinction to exclude ever-broader categories from judgment-relief despite
289. See Moore & Rogers, supra note 57, at 624-25.
290. See MOORE'S, supra note 7, at § 60.81[1][b][iv] (citing Weldon v. United States, 70
F.3d 1, 5 (2d Cir. 1995)).
291. Cf id.
292. See United States v. Throckmorton, 98 U.S. 61, 65-66, 69 (1878).
293. Cf. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 70 cmt. c (1982) (Testimonial per-
jury "conflicts are easy to propound and difficult to resolve with confidence.").
294. Throckmorton, 98 U.S. at 69.
295. See id. at 64-66.
296. See id. at 66.
297. See id. at 68-69.
298. See, e.g., Clark, supra note 22, at 542; see also Evans, supra note 160, at 1022-25.
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the real potential that the issues touched by fraud could not have been
litigated in the first instance. 299 Although Throckmorton was decided in
the common law pleading era and perpetuated in the code pleading era,
the notice pleading era amplified its categorical approach. This was, at
least in part, because of concerns about the costs of discovery and the low
threshold for litigants to plead their way into federal court under Con-
ley.300 During the notice pleading era, courts relied on the categories to
dismiss any independent action complaint that alleged a judgment was
obtained as the result of perjury, forged documents, or discovery misrep-
resentations.30 1 No level of specificity in the pleadings about a party's
inability to try an issue because of fraud could theoretically overcome this
barrier because the rule categorically excluded all intrinsic frauds.302 This
allowed the court to avoid new discovery in a closed case, but the cost of
this efficiency was undoubtedly the dismissal of independent actions
based on serious fraud allegations that prevented the presentation of is-
sues in the original trial.303 Without a developed record, the court was
left to rely on the well-established, though ill-reasoned, dogma that relief
should not lie for intrinsic fraud during the entirety of the notice pleading
era.304
The distinction has been criticized by commentators and courts alike
for decades.305 The problems they note are numerous: the distinction
does not explain why parties misled into defaulting should receive more
protection than those who are defrauded while participating in litiga-
tion;306 courts handcuffed by the distinction found clever ways to provide
relief for frauds that were clearly intrinsic, adhering to the nomenclature
of the original statement of the rule in Throckmorton but ignoring its
substance; 307 decisions applying the distinction are mired in uncertainty
and conflict;308 and the rule is used selectively and irrationally.30 9 This
criticism is well founded in 100 years of conflicting decisions and disorder
in the lower courts that stem from problems in both the literal terms of
the distinction and disparity in its application.310 Accordingly, the dis-
tinction should be eliminated for at least three reasons.
299. Intrinsic fraud bars perjury at trial and fraud in the discovery process. See, e.g.,
Kahn v. Gen. Motors Corp., No. 88 CIV. 2982, 1998 WL 812053, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 17,
1998), aff'd, 230 F.3d 1374 (Fed. Cir. 1999); see also MoORE's, supra note 7, at
§ 60.81[1][b][ii] (Intrinsic fraud bars "perjury at trial or in discovery proceedings.").
300. See, e.g., Temple, supra note 16, at 969.
301. See MOORE'S, supra note 7, at § 60.81[1][b][ii].
302. See Throckmorton, 98 U.S. at 64-66.
303. See Temple, supra note 16, at 970.
304. See Throckmorton, 98 U.S. at 66.
305. See, e.g., St. Pierre v. Edmonds, 645 P.2d 615, 619 (Utah 1982).
306. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 70 cmt. c (1982).
307. See id.
308. See Attacking Fraudulently Obtained Judgments, supra note 93, at 399 ("IT]his vex-
ing distinction has been a source of conflict in the courts" since the early 1900s.).
309. See Note, Post-Term Vacation of Judgments Obtained by Perjury, 54 COLUM. L.
REV. 403, 412 (1954).
310. See, e.g., Publicker v. Shallcross, 106 F.2d 949, 952 (3rd Cir. 1939) ("[I]n our judg-
ment ... the harsh rule of United States v. Throckmorton ... will be modified in accor-
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First, the category of intrinsic fraud is conceptually flawed because it
ignores the careful balance between the search for truth and finality em-
bodied by res judicata.311 The intrinsic fraud distinction substitutes an
arbitrary, categorical analysis of cases for a real evaluation of whether
fraud in a particular case prevented the losing party from presenting its
claim-a standard that echoes some of the basic tenets of res judicata.312
The equitable prerequisites of an independent action wisely mirror its
core function-preventing the relitigation of that which was or could
have been litigated originally.313 In contrast, the fraud categories ignore,
in many instances, the basic tenet that a final judgment does not bar liti-
gation of issues that were not or could not have been litigated in the un-
derlying action.314 In jurisdictions that adhere to the distinction, parties
cannot obtain relief even where an intrinsic fraud was completely unde-
tectable, and thus not litigated, despite their diligence.
This is especially problematic in light of Throckmorton's original,
somewhat internally inconsistent observation that fraud is extrinsic (and
thus actionable) where it prevents an opposing party from presenting a
claim.315 In Throckmorton, Justice Miller wrote that relief from a judg-
ment should be available where a "party has been prevented from
presenting all of his case to the court. ' 316 The Court provided several
examples of conduct that would prevent a party from presenting its case
in court (extrinsic fraud): a defendant prevented from knowing about a
suit by a plaintiff who then takes a default judgment, a party prevented
from presenting a claim by a conniving attorney working with the other
dance with the more salutary doctrine of Marshall v. Holmes .... We believe the truth is
more important than the trouble it takes to get it.").
311. At least one commentator suggests that questions surrounding independent action
relief from judgments are best resolved by res judicata principles. MOORE'S, supra note 7,
at § 60.81[1][b][iv]. This is sensible because those principles are already reflected in the
equitable elements of the independent action. Those elements focus, in large part, on the
aggrieved party's ability and diligence to detect and raise the fraud claim in the original
action. See Bankers Mortg. Co. v. United States, 423 F.2d 73, 79 (5th Cir. 1970).
312. In United States v. Beggerly, the Court recognized the interrelationship between
independent action relief and res judicata, observing that "[i]ndependent actions must, if
Rule 60(b) is to be interpreted as a coherent whole, be reserved for those cases of 'injus-
tices which, in certain instances, are deemed sufficiently gross to demand a departure' from
rigid adherence to the doctrine of res judicata." United States v. Beggerly, 524 U.S. 38, 46
(1998) (quoting Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. Hartford-Empire Co., 322 U.S. 238, 244 (1944)).
313. Because of res judicata, in some circumstances, "[an independent action plaintiff]
may not relitigate [claims] of misrepresentation that she could have litigated, and to a great
extent did litigate, in [the original litigation]. Only if [the plaintiff] had had no opportunity
to litigate the allegations of fraud... could this action go forward." MooRE's, supra note
7, at § 60.81[1][b][iv] n.13 (quoting Weldon v. United States, 70 F.3d 1, 5 (2d Cir. 1995)).
314. Importantly, res judicata "does not apply to direct attacks on judgments. 'Res judi-
cata does not preclude a litigant from making a direct attack [under Rule 60(b)] upon the
judgment before the court which rendered it."' Watts v. Pinckney, 752 F.2d 406, 410 (9th
Cir. 1985) (emphasis in original). But see Weldon, 70 F.3d at 5 (["Plaintiff's independent
action], however, is not direct: the very grounds on which she claims fraud upon the
court-the government's alleged misrepresentation and misconduct-were 'raised or
should have been raised ... during the pendency of the earlier case'.. . [t]hus, res judicata
barred this independent action to void the judgment.").
315. See United States v. Throckmorton, 98 U.S. 61, 65-66 (1878).
316. Id. at 65.
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side, or a false promise to settle a case.317 While these are undoubtedly
instances where a party should have relief from a judgment, the Court
goes on to enumerate supposed "equally well settled" categories of con-
duct that constitute intrinsic fraud: perjury, presentation of fraudulent ev-
idence, "or for any matter which was actually presented and considered
in the judgment assailed. '318 There are numerous examples, however, of
perjury and fraudulent evidence that would, indeed, prevent a party from
presenting her case in court.319
For instance, imagine that a corporate representative testifies on behalf
of a defendant. The substance of the testimony is peculiarly within the
knowledge of the corporation, like subjective awareness of risk in the
gross negligence context. At deposition, the witness falsely testifies that
the corporation had no knowledge of the particular risk. This perjury is
the result of a conspiracy between the officers of the corporation and the
witness. Further, assume the plaintiff is diligent in examining the witness,
conducting document discovery, and investigating the corporation's sub-
jective knowledge, but despite the diligence, the plaintiff is unable to de-
tect the perjury or conspiracy. In large part, the deceptive skill of the
witness and the defendant helps to conceal the perjury. Accordingly, the
plaintiff suffers dismissal of the gross negligence claim or loses at the
summary judgment stage. A judgment is signed in favor of the defendant
based on the perjured testimony. Several years later, a whistle-blower
comes forward with an email from the defendant to the witness exposing
the scam. Forensic examination confirms that the email is authentic. This
scenario surely shows that the plaintiff was unable to fully present her
claims because of the skilled deception of the defendant. And the perjury
issue was not "actually presented and considered" in any meaningful
sense.320 But perjury is an enumerated category of intrinsic fraud and not
subject to postplenary review. 321 Thus, perjury might, in limited in-
stances, satisfy the literal language of the Throckmorton standard but still
be categorically barred. 322 This internal inconsistency has grown worse as
courts of appeals have interpreted and applied Throckmorton. The in-
trinsic fraud category has grown to include discovery fraud.323 This is
particularly problematic in the context of the nonproduction of docu-
317. Id. at 65-66.
318. Id. at 66.
319. And unfortunately, the deterrent mechanisms built into the civil system do little to
thwart perjury. John L. Watts, To Tell the Truth: A Qui Tam Action for Perjury in a Civil
Proceeding is Necessary to Protect the Integrity of the Civil Judicial System, 79 TEMP. L.
REV. 773, 779-92 (2006). Indeed, "[v]ery rarely will a witness or party in a typical civil suit
face criminal prosecution, even for clear cases of perjury." Id. at 782. Besides the virtual
absence of criminal prosecutions for civil perjury, ethical rules, social and moral considera-
tions, and cross examination are also ineffective at uncovering perjury in many instances.
Id. at 779-92.
320. Throckmorton, 98 U.S. at 66.
321. See id.
322. See id.
323. See, e.g., Kahn v. Gen. Motors Corp., No. 88 CIV. 2982, 1998 WL 812053, at *2
(S.D.N.Y. Nov. 17, 1998), affd, 230 F.3d 1374 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
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ments. Where documents are peculiarly within the control of the oppos-
ing party, a claimant must rely on the candor of an adversary in disclosing
relevant materials.324 If the claimant has reason to suspect that materials
are being withheld, she may file a motion to compel and even obtain a
court order to compel production.325 But compliance with these orders is
usually verified by sworn statements from the adversary.326 If the adver-
sary fraudulently represents that they have produced all documents
within the scope of the order and the judge is satisfied, the claimant may
not be able to do anything else to obtain evidence. 327 When this vacuum
of proof prevents a claimant from establishing her claim and she discov-
ers the fraud many years later, it would seem to put her squarely within
Throckmorton's command that judgments should not survive if fraud by
an opposing party "prevented [a claimant] from presenting all of [her]
case to the court. '328 But because, according to lower courts, intrinsic
fraud includes perjury in discovery proceedings, relief is not possible.329
Thus, in addition to the dissonance between the intrinsic fraud category
and the truth-finding features of res judicata, inconsistencies in
Throckmorton itself support abolishing the distinction.330
The second reason to abolish the distinction is that the fraud categories
are applied inconsistently, creating an unwarranted disparity of outcomes
in similar cases. There are, of course, circuits and states that do not ob-
serve the distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic fraud.331 This creates
one breed of disparity. But even among courts that adhere to the distinc-
tion, disparate outcomes result from seemingly similar facts. The incon-
sistency stems, in large part, from Throckmorton's holding that a
judgment should not withstand an attack based on fraud that prevented a
party from presenting a claim.332 Some courts have used this language as
wiggle room, holding that where perjury (or other intrinsic fraud) pre-
vents the presentation of a claim, it should be treated like extrinsic fraud,
despite its original categorization. 333 This same scenario could arise in
324. Gerald G. Glaser, A New Law of "Supply and Demand" in Discovery, 69 A.B.A. J.
320, 321 (1983).
325. See FED. R. Civ. P. 37(a).
326. See, e.g., Fairfield Fin. Mortg. Group v. Luca, No. CV06-5962, 2008 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 94159, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 19, 2008).
327. See id.
328. United States v. Throckmorton, 98 U.S. 61, 66 (1878).
329. See Kahn v. Gen. Motors Corp., No. 88 CIV. 2982, 1998 WL 812053, at *2
(S.D.N.Y. Nov. 17, 1998), affd, 230 F.3d 1374 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
330. Shammas v. Shammas, 88 A.2d 204, 208-09 (N.J. 1952) (Brennan, J.) ("[W]e agree
that it is 'a journey into futility to attempt a distinction between extrinsic and intrinsic
matter' ... Plainly, the encouragement of vexatious litigation is the lesser evil. We prefer to
follow the equity of the matter and to take away an unjust judgment obtained by vital
perjury when the injustice and inequity of allowing it to stand are made evident.").
331. See Gleason v. Jandrucko, 860 F.2d 556, 560 (2d Cir. 1988) (mentioning in dicta
that the distinction is not viable); Publicker v. Shallcross, 106 F.2d 949, 950-52 (3d Cir.
1939).
332. See Throckmorton, 98 U.S. at 66.
333. Even the Supreme Court took this liberty only a few years after Throckmorton
was decided. See Marshall v. Holmes, 141 U.S. 589, 596 (1891); see also RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 70 cmt. c (1982).
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the context of discovery fraud allegations. If the fraud prevents a party
from presenting a claim, some courts have held that the misrepresenta-
tions in discovery are actionable.334 So despite the adherence to the in-
trinsic and extrinsic labels, some courts effectively circumvent the
distinction. 335 Other courts adhere to it rigidly.336 Thus, courts treat liti-
gants in seemingly similar factual situations disparately.
Because of this disparate application, litigants have no certainty, as a
practical matter, that a judgment is really final. A court may dismiss an
independent action for perjury based on the fact that perjury is part of
the intrinsic category, 337 or the court might find that perjury prevented
the presentation of a claim and relieve the aggrieved party from the ef-
fects of the judgment.338 Whether the court does this is largely based on
the court's view of factors and equities that have little, if nothing, to do
with the categories through which it will ultimately state (or mask) its
decision. 339 This is problematic on many levels. First, the justification for
the distinction supposedly lies in its ability to provide more finality and
certainty in judgments.340 But when a judgment is attacked because of
fraud, whether it is truly final or subject to reopening cannot be deter-
mined by a quick glance at a list of intrinsic and extrinsic frauds. Instead,
the court's decision could turn on a number of extra-distinction factors.
341
As a result, the distinction introduces an unacceptable level of uncer-
tainty about whether a judgment is subject to reopening into the system.
Second, similarly situated litigants are treated disparately. They may be
treated disparately because their cases arise in circuits that disagree on
the distinction.342 Worse yet, they could be treated disparately in the
same courthouse because of conflicting interpretations of the troubled
distinction. 343 Third, the presence of such doctrinal disarray leads to con-
fusion and difficulty for judges attempting to apply the muddled stan-
dards. Even if a judge wanted to adhere to the distinction, it would be
difficult to do so in many jurisdictions because of the conflicting prece-
dent. Supposedly, all of these problems are worth the cost because the
alternative is protracted, never-ending litigation on matters that should
have been final long ago. 344 But existing and new pleading standards
provide a threshold barrier that will effectively screen most, if not all,
unnecessarily repetitious litigation at the motion to dismiss phase.
334. See Throckmorton, 98 U.S. at 65-66. Cf, e.g., MMAR Group, Inc. v. Dow Jones &
Co., 187 F.R.D. 282, 292 (S.D. Tex. 1999).
335. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 70 cmt. c (1982).
336. See id.
337. See Gleason v. Jandrucko, 860 F.2d 556, 559-60 (2nd Cir. 1988).
338. See Leber-Krebs, Inc. v. Capitol Records, 779 F.2d 895, 899-900 (2d. Cir. 1985).
339. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 70 cmt. c (1982).
340. See United States v. Throckmorton, 98 U.S. 61, 65-66 (1878).
341. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 70 cmt. c (1982).
342. Compare Publicker v. Shallcross, 106 F.2d 949, 950-52 (3d Cir. 1939), with Great
Coastal Express, Inc. v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 675 F.2d 1349, 1358 (4th Cir. 1982).
343. Compare Gleason v. Jandrucko, 860 F.2d 556; 559-60 (2d. Cir. 1988), with Leber-
Krebs, 779 F.2d at 899-900.
344. See Throckmorton, 98 U.S. at 68-69.
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Contemporary pleading standards provide the third reason to abolish
the distinction because they reduce the risk that doing so will result in
costly relitigation of cases.345 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)
provides an efficient mechanism to dispose of lawsuits (including inde-
pendent actions) that do not state a valid claim for relief.346 Recently,
the motion to dismiss was given real teeth (or bigger teeth) through the
pleading standards announced in Twombly and Iqbal.347 The early em-
pirical evidence suggests that courts are employing Twombly and Iqbal to
dismiss actions with increasing frequency at the pleadings stage. 348 The
inconveniences of, and resources devoted to, litigation dismissed at the
pleadings stage are minimal. 349 Indeed, a party files a complaint, the op-
posing party moves to dismiss, and several briefs of reasonable length are
exchanged. The judge then decides whether the litigation proceeds or
stops in its tracks-before discovery. This is critical because complaints
about the cost and expense of relitigation generally refer to the admit-
tedly expensive discovery process.350 Thus, any screening mechanism
that effectively protects litigants from costs, and courts from increased
burdens, has to be in place before discovery.
During the notice pleading era, the fear of costly relitigation was, in
part, well-founded. Rule 9(b) required, and still requires, that a party
state fraud allegations with particularity, including fraud allegations in an
independent action.351 But during the Conley era, the remaining inde-
pendent action allegations (related, in large part, to the lack of previous
opportunities to litigate the fraud) only needed to satisfy Conley's notice
pleading standard. 352 Thus, pleading any set of facts that was consistent
with a party acting diligently to discover the fraud, without negligence,
and the other equitable requirements was satisfactory. Assuming that the
party pleaded an extrinsic fraud, the case would go forward to discovery.
This system placed the emphasis on the categories as a screening mecha-
nism; categorizing frauds provided a bulwark against unnecessary relitiga-
tion of some cases at the expense of dismissing cases that had never seen
a fair day in court. But after Twombly and Iqbal, courts have a new,
345. Even before the increased pleading standards, experience has shown that out-of-
control relitigation does not occur in jurisdictions where there is no distinction. See Clark,
supra note 22, at 551-53.
346. See FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
347. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949-50 (2009); Bell Atd. Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544, 554-57 (2006).
348. Indeed, the empirical evidence suggests that the new screening mechanism will be
effective. The rate of 12(b)(6) dismissals has increased since the court decided Twombly
and Iqbal. As some commentators have noted, this may have varying, unintended, and
negative consequences for civil litigation in the federal courts. But whatever the effect on
access to justice may be for civil litigants, empirical evidence plausibility requirement of
Rule 8, coupled with 9(b)'s already stringent fraud pleading requirements, gives the
12(b)(6) motion real teeth for screening independent actions. See Miller, supra note 243,
at 20-21.
349. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 559.
350. See id.
351. See FED. R. Civ. P. 9(b).
352. See Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47-48 (1957).
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more effective screening mechanism for the nonfraud allegations, and
thus, the independent action as a whole.
Twombly and Iqbal changed the game for the nonfraud independent
action allegations. Beyond alleging fraud, parties seeking a judgment
must plausibly allege that they acted diligently to discover the fraud, that
the fraud was material to the claim or defense, and that the action satis-
fies the other equitable requirements. 353 Accordingly, these allegations
cannot be conclusory, and they must be sufficiently factually specific. 3 54
The increased focus on the specificity of the nonfraud allegations mini-
mizes the risk of unnecessary relitigation. 355 If parties cannot detail the
means through which they were prevented from fairly presenting their
claim, then the case is dismissed before discovery. If, on the other hand,
they are able to adequately detail that they acted diligently but were still
unable to discover the fraud, and that the fraud prevented a fair presenta-
tion of the case, the independent action survives.356 Likewise, the party
seeking relief must plausibly plead that the judgment is manifestly uncon-
scionable or a gross injustice.357 This new, meaningful sorting mechanism
strips the categories of any remaining value that they had and replaces
them with a system that more adequately balances litigation cost and the
need for all issues to have their day in court. This is, in large part, be-
cause the nature of the nonfraud allegations revolves around whether the
issues were, or should have been, litigated in the original lawsuit.
Thus, in place of the intrinsic and extrinsic categories that roughly and
ineffectively identified categories of fraud that should have been detected
and litigated in the first instance, plausibility screening allows courts to
actually identify such cases at the pleading stage. This development al-
lows courts to openly do what many have done for years behind the mask
of the categories-screen independent actions based on whether the
party had a fair shot to discover and present the issue in the original law-
suit.358 This approach is consistent with the call of some commentators
and implicit signals from the Supreme Court for independent action relief
to more closely trace the contours of res judicata. 359
353. The courts are already employing the plausibility standard in the context of inde-
pendent actions. See, e.g., LinkCo, Inc. v. Akikusa, 615 F. Supp. 2d 130, 133-34 (S.D.N.Y.
2009) (party must plausibly allege independent action claim).
354. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949-50 (2009).
355. See Luke Meier, Why Twombly Is Good Law (But Poorly Drafted) and Iqbal Will
Be Overturned, 87 IND. L.J. (forthcoming 2012) ("Twombly was a case about the factual
specificity, or the lack thereof, in the plaintiffs' complaint.").
356. But what if the party seeking relief from a judgment simply fabricates fraud allega-
tions to advance to discovery from the pleadings stage to impose a burden on the opposing
party? Ultimately, the fabrication could be exposed by the other party during discovery
and then significant monetary sanctions are available pursuant to Rule 11. See FED. R.
Civ. P. 11. This is a significant deterrent to pleading fabricated fraud claims in an indepen-
dent action and bolsters the efficacy of Rule 9(b)'s heightened pleading standard.
357. See United States v. Beggerly, 524 U.S. 38, 46 (1998).
358. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 70 cmt. c (1982).
359. Compare MOORE'S, supra note 7, at § 60.81[1][b][iv] (principles of res judicata are
better to resolve judgment-relief questions than the distinction between intrinsic and ex-
trinsic fraud), with Beggerly, 524 U.S. at 46 ("Independent actions must ... be reserved for
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Abolishing the intrinsic and extrinsic categories through Twombly and
Iqbal's effective screening mechanism would minimize disparity between
similarly situated litigants. First, abolishing the distinction would resolve
a circuit split,360 and thus, litigants across the country would face a similar
judgment-relief standard when asserting fraud claims. Second, abolishing
the distinction allows courts to honestly and openly state their reasons for
dismissing independent actions. This in itself would lead to more consis-
tent outcomes. For instance, in the current system some courts have held
that perjury may be extrinsic fraud where it prevents a claim from being
presented, but other courts have flatly held that perjury is always an in-
trinsic fraud. 361 If the distinction were abolished, the emphasis would
shift to the nonfraud allegations in each individual perjury case to deter-
mine whether the fraud was detectable through diligence and whether the
perjured testimony likely affected the outcome. Thus, if two perjury
cases resulted in different outcomes, the holdings would distinguish the
cases on their actual facts, not arbitrary categories. This is likely to lead
to both consistent outcomes and more harmonious precedent.
Additionally, advancements in both the availability and quality of the
proof necessary to sustain an independent action dovetail with the new,
heightened pleading requirements. Indeed, modem advances in the
availability and reliability of proof have increased a party's ability to ex-
pose fraud. These advances can also definitively demonstrate that a party
could not have tried the issue in the underlying case. Of particular note,
modern forensic document analysis allows experts to determine with
near-certainty if a document is forged.362 Similarly, a vast amount of data
created by computer users can confirm or dispel a perjury allegation and
may not be discovered until many years after a judgment is final.
For example, imagine that an executive testifies in a commercial dis-
pute to the truth of proposition Y. Based on this testimony, the execu-
tive's company obtains a judgment in its favor. Many years later, a
missing computer backup tape is discovered containing an email authored
by the executive showing that, at or before the time he testified, he knew
proposition Y to be false. Computer forensics experts confirm that the
tape and email are authentic. Under the intrinsic fraud bar, the allega-
tion of perjury would not support an independent action, even where the
plaintiff demonstrated that she acted diligently through forensic evidence.
Thus, the judgment would persevere despite hard scientific proof that it
those cases of injustices which, in certain instances, are deemed sufficiently gross to de-
mand a departure from rigid adherence to the doctrine of res judicata.") (internal quota-
tions omitted).
360. Compare Publicker v. Shallcross, 106 F.2d 949, 950-52 (3d Cir. 1939), with Great
Coastal Express v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 675 F.2d 1349, 1358 (4th Cir. 1982).
361. Compare Publicker, 106 F.2d at 950-52, with Great Coastal Express, 675 F.2d at
1358.
362. See Jennifer Scillitoe, Questioned Documents-Still a Vital Forensic Tool, LAB




was obtained by fraud and the issues were never tested in the original
litigation.
Of course, this was not the state of the world when the Court decided
Throckmorton.363 Allegations of perjury were almost always supported
by the testimony of a new witness claiming to know some fact that
demonstrated that the previous witness's testimony was false. Thus, relief
from judgments based on a perjury allegation quickly devolved into a he-
said-she-said. Because the loser in the previous judgment could always
attempt to drum up a witness to undermine the testimony supporting the
previous judgment, courts were, perhaps rightfully, concerned that litiga-
tion on any particular matter could be endless. 364 But modern forensic
science and a wealth of hard, nontestimonial proof has altered this
landscape.
These same developments undermine the intrinsic fraud bar on relief
from judgments obtained through discovery, misrepresentations, and
omissions. If a party destroys documents that are material to a lawsuit,
those documents may live on in perpetuity on computer backups. These
backups may be located on the premises of the fraudulent actor, or they
might very well be located on the premises of a computer or server com-
pany operating an offsite "cloud" backup facility. Although the docu-
ments may not come to light during litigation, this does not mean they
will never be discovered. Assuming the party deprived of the documents
loses the lawsuit because of the nonproduction and that the losing party
acts diligently to procure them both in the lawsuit and after the judgment,
the winning party should not benefit from its fraud. But according to the
reasoning of Throckmorton's progeny, the fraudulent actor is protected
because discovery omissions are intrinsic fraud. The category, by its lit-
eral terms, would bar relitigation even in the face of undisputed forensic
proof that the other party willfully destroyed and did not produce the
documents. Thus, the distinction is inaccurate and should be abolished.
The distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic fraud should be abol-
ished. To do so, the Supreme Court could resolve the current circuit split.
Short of that, the distinction could be abolished through the rulemaking
process. Judgments should reflect a process based on the values of integ-
rity, candor, and accuracy, even where those values trump the value of
finality in judgments. Indeed, any effective judgment-relief framework
should be premised on the idea that the "truth is more important than the
trouble it takes to get it."' 365 Accordingly, the Court should finally put
the distinction out of its misery.
363. See United States v. Throckmorton, 98 U.S. 61, 69 (1878).
364. But see Shammas v. Shammas, 88 A.2d 204, 208-09 (N.J. 1952) (Brennan, J.) ("The
notion that repeated retrials of cases may be expected to follow the setting aside of judg-
ments rendered on false testimony will not withstand critical analysis. Rather it is more
logical to anticipate that the guilty litigant committing or suborning testimony will not risk
pursuing the cause further.").
365. Publicker, 106 F.2d at 952.
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